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     ABSTRACT 
 
  
This dissertation examines the nature of Greek-Turkish relations during the years of 
“rapprochement”, 1999-2007 in energy security policy, especially by concentrated to 
the oil and gas pipeline diplomacy on each country. Helsinki U-turn and earthquake 
diplomacy offered the appropriate preconditions for Greece and Turkey to engage the 
period of “rapprochement” in their bilateral relations.  Energy security policy is a 
critical factor of the overall power status of a nation/international body and a powerful 
instrument of effective and forceful nation/international policy making. Instead, 
pipeline diplomacy (cross-border pipelines) is more than just an economic 
cooperation among nations; rather it has security and geopolitical nature. In both 
cases (Greek and Turkish) third party role directly influence the route of energy 
security policy and pipeline diplomacy. While 2004 onwards, after Cyprus accession 
to EU and the opening of Turkish-European negotiating process, Greek-Turkish 
relations seems that demoted to the level of a dètente, according to energy security 
policy level they established a cooperating status.    
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     ÖZET 
 
 
Bu tez, ''yakınlaşma'' yılları arasındaki Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin doğasını, 1999-2007 
yılları arasındaki enerji güvenliği politikaları ve özellikle iki ülkedeki petrol ve gaz 
boru hattı diplomasisi açısından inceler. Helsinki U-turn ve deprem diplomasisi, 
Yunanistan ve Türkiye'ye ikili ilişkilerinde ''yakınlaşma'' sürecini başlatmıştır. Enerji 
güvenliği politikası, bir ülkenin güç statüsünde, uluslararası organizasyonlarında ve 
etkili bir ülke olmasında önemli bir rol oynar. Bunun yerine boru hattı diplomasisi, 
ülkeler arasında ekonomik işbirliği, güvenlik ve jeopolitik karakteridir. Her iki ülke 
açısından da (Türkiye-Yunanistan) üçüncü şahıslar, enerji güvenliği politikasını ve 
boru hattı diplomasisini doğrudan etkiler. 2004 ve sonrasındaki dönemde Kıbrıs'ın 
AB'ye girmesi ve Türkiye müzakerelerinin başlamasından sonra, Türk-Yunan 
ilişkileri '' dètente'' seviyesine gerilemiştir ama enerji güvenliği politikaları açısından 
işbirliğine başlamışlardır. 
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Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the nature of Greek-Turkish relations, 
through the lens of energy security policy, and pipeline diplomacy. The main focus of 
the current script is on oil and gas pipelines project/activities (in the wider area of 
Eurasia), in an attempt to trace and define the role of (modern) International Relations 
doctrine; and its possible effects/influence on to Greek and Turkish reconciliation 
process. The author’s perception is that pipeline diplomacy is incorporated in the 
wider spectrum of energy security policy, which is a structural parameter of modern 
geopolitics; thus from a specific point of analysis to a wider one. Furthermore, the 
period of “rapprochement” process is considered to be the historical backbone, on 
which, the present study will be based. During that period (1999 onwards) Greece and 
Turkey had intensified their energy security - pipeline diplomacy policies.  
 In the beginning, we offer the historical framework of Greek-Turkish relations 
since 1996. The essence of Greek-Turkish conflict in modern period lies on two 
critical areas. Cyprus and Aegean Sea issues stand at the nucleus of all conflicts 
between the two countries. Greek-Turkish dispute(s) reflect not only the different 
perspectives in bilateral relations, but also define the range of further cooperation or 
antagonism among the two parties in Southeastern Mediterranean region. 
Additionally, the Greek-Turkish “rapprochement” process offers us an interesting 
case study, which we attempt to explain by Putnam’s Two Level Game theory. This 
theory allow us  to analyze the effects of domestic-level constraints on the "win-sets" 
on Greek-Turkish “rapprochement” process (1999-2004) and realize the pre-
conditions as long as the future challenges and risks of such a venture in bilateral 
relations. In 2004, Cyprus accession in the EU and the opening of Turkey-EU’s 
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negotiating process, were catalytic events that reversed the status over Greek-Turkish-
Cypriot trilateral affairs. During the period 2004-2007, the Greek-Turkish dilemmas 
over issues such as Cyprus and the Aegean revived and new dimensions in the 
bilateral relations such as the energy security and pipeline diplomacy emerged.             
 Chapters one and two laid the groundwork for the theoretical framework 
through which the given analysis will be conducted. Energy security policy composes 
a vital element in modern foreign politics. As a consequence, there is a need to 
provide a brief clarification on the terminology and definitions used in this paper 
(Ch.2). Terms such as: geopolitics, geo-strategy, energy security policy, cross-border 
pipelines are to be explained further in the essay. In the course of this examination, it 
seems that energy security policy was and will be a critical factor of the overall power 
status of a nation and a powerful instrument for effective and forceful national policy-
making. 
  Chapter three deal with the Greek energy security policy in the Eastern 
Mediterranean region and the Balkans. Greek Europeanization process along with the 
geostrategic advantages and disadvantages of the Greek Republic, constitute the 
initial framework, by which, we can realize the range and level of Greek security 
policy. Furthermore, a short presentation of the current and planned energy networks 
and oil/gas pipeline projects follows. It is important to highlight that cross-border 
oil/gas pipeline projects are not just an economic cooperation among states. As a 
result, the examination for third party’s role (EU-USA-Russia) in Greek energy 
security and pipeline diplomacy is crucial in order to foresee any potential 
developments in the Greek energy field, and Greece’s future position as a transit state 
in South-eastern Europe.  
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Respectively, we present the Turkish case (Ch.3). Turkey’s Energy security 
policy and pipeline diplomacy in Central Asia, Caucasus, the Black Sea region and 
South-eastern Europe is a crucial element in modern Turkish foreign policy agenda. 
The geostrategic position of Turkey as a ‘natural’ bridge, between Middle East and 
Caucasus region on one hand, and the European peninsula on the other, renders 
Turkey as a future key - regional player in the wider Eurasian region. Erdoğan’s 
‘Strategic depth’ doctrine and “neo-Ottomanic” Turkish aspirations present the census 
of modern Turkey’s foreign policy over the Eurasian region. It is a fact that Turkey, 
unlike Greece, is already an energy transit state; a reality that is manifested through its 
current energy infrastructure, present and future oil/gas pipeline projects. 
Nevertheless, Turkish energy policy inspirations to be an energy hub between East 
and West rely on third party strategies in Eurasia as well. US-European converged 
energy policy interests in the region, and Russian antagonistic efforts to restore its 
hegemonic role in former Soviet Union’s zones of interest by using energy as a mean 
or a tool, are significant aspects for understanding Turkey’s energy policy initiatives.  
After the presentation of Greek and Turkish energy agendas, Chapter four 
discusses the degree in which Greek and Turkish energy security and pipeline policies 
are cooperative or competitive. The Turkish-Greek gas pipeline “Interconnector” is a 
significant paradigm of cooperation among the two neighboring countries in the 
energy field and an indicator, for the Greek and Turkish sides, who can potentially 
develop bilateral policies and expand them at a higher level. On the contrary, through 
the comparison between Bourgas - Alexandroupolis and Baku – Tbilisi - Ceyhan oil 
pipeline projects - and their interlinked pipeline projects - that follows, we are trying 
to see if the above mentioned ventures compose another field of confrontation 
between Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, we try to identify how USA-Russian 
12 
 
conflicting energy policies influence bilateral and multilateral relations in Eurasia and 
how they and the EU as a third factor reflect the current route of Greek-Turkish 
energy policy agendas (apart from the ongoing issues diplomatically, politically as 
well as economically speaking). 
In the concluding chapter, the aim is to present a brief explanation of our 
thesis topic inquiry. The potential opportunities and challenges in both countries due 
to their energy security policies will be presented and will be answered by the 
following set of questions: To what extent did the “rapprochement” procedure sets a 
stable base on which, Greek-Turkish differences can reach a potential solution in the 
near future? How did this process of reconciliation influence the Energy policy-pipeline 
diplomacy in Greece and Turkey and how did these developments affect Greek-
Turkish relations? Recent pipeline projects in Greece and Turkey formed an 
antagonistic or have they created a cooperative environment between the two states? 
Is a potential weakening of “rapprochement” process possible/capable to destabilize 
the Turkish-Greece relations over energy policy issues? Among all the above 
mentioned questions, the most important issue about Energy policy and pipeline 
diplomacy is the following: First and foremost, to what extent a transit state has the 
ability to use its pipeline networks to exercise national foreign policy and how this 
capacity can strengthen or impede certain bilateral and multilateral relations with 
other states which are connected by the same pipeline networks or excluded by a 
project.  
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Part I: Greek-Turkish relations, 1923-2007 
The historical framework of modern Greek-Turkish relations, 1923-1996 
Admittedly, the multifarious nature and course of Greek-Turkish relations the 
last nine decades (since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923) have 
composed a unique field of analysis in international relations. Tensions and rivalry, 
which periodically have escalated and have brought the two countries “close to an all-
out war in 1974, 1976, 1983, 1987, 1996,1998 and 1999”1,along with significant 
periods of betterment and peaceful coexistence, still stigmatize bilateral relations in 
Greece and Turkey. 
The Lausanne settlement in 1923 and the subsequent exchange of population 
between Greece and Turkey was a response to the fundamental necessity of modernity 
for two independent homogeneous nation-states2 and for the establishment of solid-
“stable” land and maritime boundaries.  
However, half a century later and specifically in 1974, the Lausanne’s Treaty 
alleged3 boundary stability changed. According to Brian W. Beeley, Cyprus de facto 
partition had revealed in 1974 that: “Ankara […] wishe[d] to renegotiate the 
agreement over the Aegean in face of the prospect of oil under the sea bed.”4 In the 
aftermath of Cyprus invasion/intervene5 and the ongoing three decades, the bilateral  
                                                            
1 T. A.Couloumbis and A. E. Kentikelenis, ‘Greek‐Turkish Relations and the Kantian Democratic Peace 
Theory’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, ELIAMEP, Vol. 7, No 4, (December 2007), pp.518  
2 Obviously  the consequences of such a measure have  traumatic and disastrous outcomes  for both 
populations and have marked the history of Greece and Turkey with dark pages. 
3 Referring to the way Greece and Turkey examine its legal aspects. 
4 B. W.Belley, ‘The Greek‐Turkish boundary: Conflict at the interface’, Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers, New Series  , Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Geographical Society  , 
1978,pp.351 
5 The usage of double terminology reflects the antithetic perceptions of Greece and Turkey over this 
issue. This writing technique will be followed  in the rest of the essay present both countries aspect 
(Greece’s/Turkey’s) without further inquiry. 
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relations passed through serious periods of deterioration which shaped the foreign 
policy agenda of Greco-Turkish controversy over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea.  
Jon M. Van Dyke in his ‘analysis of the Aegean Disputes under International 
Law’ offers how Greece and Turkey perceive their dispute(s)6 over Aegean. Greece 
considers the delimitation of the continental self as the only unresolved and 
problematic issue. Turkey claims a set of assertions by questioning: the sovereignty 
over certain islands (grey zone theory)7, the de-militarization of Eastern Aegean 
Greek islands close to Turkish Anatolian coasts, the breath of the territorial waters 
around Greece’s Aegean islands- the longitude/length of Greek national airspace and 
F.I.R status over the Aegean.8 
Greece and Turkey, the two countries that encircle the Aegean Sea, are in 
conflict about the Aegean’s strategically control. “The more of the Aegean over 
which each country has sovereignty, the better its economy will be. There would be 
more potential shipping that each could control and more potential oil, gas and 
mineral reserves that each could reap. More sovereignty over the Aegean means more 
fishing, and could also boost potential money for recreation and tourism.”9The 
settlement of the sea boundaries in Aegean, which is a law/political decision-making 
case, composes a crucial factor that will form a realistic political and negotiable field 
for the systematic ameliorating process for the two neighboring countries. 
                                                            
6 J. M. Van Dyke, An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes under  International Law,(Hawaii: University of 
Hawaii, 2005), pp.63 
7 Imia/Kardak crisis derivative was according to T. Veremis that: “the new Turkish claim was the first 
regarding  Greek  territory,  accompanied  with  statements  over  “grey  zones”  in  the  whole  of  the   
Aegean.”  see  Thanos  Veremis,  Ιστορία  των  Ελληνοτουρκικών  σχέσεων,1453‐2003,  [The  history  of 
Greek‐Turkish relations, 1453‐2003],  (Athens: I. Sideris, ELIAMEP third edition, 2003), pp.166  
8See  also  http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en‐US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/South‐Eastern+Europe 
/  Turkey/Turkish+claims/  (Greek  argumentation);,  http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?    a5665231‐
082c‐4832‐abdb‐46cf75694b50 (Turkish argumentation) 
9  A. M.  Syrigos,  The  status  of  the  Aegean  Sea  according  to  International  Law,(  Athens &Brussels: 
Sakkoulas/Bruylant publications, 1998), pp. 355 
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Nasmi Akiman argues that: “it is apparent that progress in the climate of 
relations and agreements on a host of noncontroversial subjects cannot be a substitute 
to resolving the two major issues, the Aegean and Cyprus[…] there are major risks of 
the current détente faltering and causing more aggravation or even worse for the two 
neighbors.”10  
As a matter of fact, Cyprus and Aegean Sea disputes are historically 
interlinked and an indicative solution seems to presuppose simultaneous or successive 
agreements in both fields of dispute. 
The examination of Greek-Turkish relations cannot be achieved by limiting 
this event as a pure local issue. External dynamics and international environment have 
and will influence the developments over Greece and Turkey. Admittedly, the 
collapse of Soviet Union (USSR) and the subsequent end of Cold War brought to the 
surface an entire new environment in Eurasia region and mainly in the perception 
over geopolitics. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact through the agreement of 25th of 
February 199111 denoted the end of the World War II bipolar structure and led to the 
emersion of ‘newly independent states’, including the Russian Federation. 
European security environment rapidly changed and new challenges from the 
East arose mostly because of the existence of enormous amounts of hydrocarbon 
natural sources in the Caspian Sea and Caucasus region. This fact combined with the 
oncoming depletion of Middle-Eastern energy reserves and OPEC monopolistic 
policies constitute an explosive cocktail for this region. This “gap” in the former 
                                                            
10  N.  Akiman,  ‘Turkish‐Greek  Relations:  From  Uneasy  Coexistence  to  Better  Relations?  A  retired 
Ambassador  Takes  Stock’ Mediterranean Quarterly  ,  Project MUSE,  Vol.  13, No.  3,  Summer  2002, 
pp.30 
11 R. Allison and C. Bluth, Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia, (Great Britain: The Royal Institute 
of International Affairs: Russia and Eurasia Programme, 1998), pp.335 
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Soviet Union’s zone of interest became a major field of competition among the West 
and Russia. European energy security ‘environment’ and the U.S.A energy policies in 
Eurasia along with Russian national and geostrategic interests entered a new era of 
contradicted and erratic relations. Energy and its safe-strategic (politically and 
economically speaking) transportation constitute the new arena of antagonism among 
the great powers in 21th century.                
Eventually, the aim of this paper is to analyze how and under which conditions 
Greek-Turkish relations were shaped during the 1999-2007 period in a particular but 
crucial field, this of Energy policy and especially by examining a specific sector: the 
pipeline diplomacy of Greece and Turkey. Each country tried to adapt to this new 
global era by exercising energy policies which could upgrade their international and 
regional position. 
A set of questions raises the issue over a modern but controversial dimension 
of Greek-Turkish relations: To what extent did the “rapprochement” procedure create 
a stable base under which Greek-Turkish relations can reach a potential solution in the 
near future? How did this process of reconciliation influence the Energy policy-pipeline 
diplomacy in Greece and Turkey and how did these developments affect Greek-
Turkish relations? Recent pipeline projects in Greece and Turkey formed an 
antagonistic or have they created a cooperative environment between the two states? 
Is a potential weakening of “rapprochement” process possible/capable to destabilize 
the Greek-Turkish relations over energy policy issues? Among all the above 
mentioned questions the most important issue about Energy policy and pipeline 
diplomacy is the following: First and foremost, to what extent a transit state has the 
ability to use its pipeline networks to exercise national foreign policy and how this 
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capacity can strengthen or impede bilateral and multilateral relations with other states 
which are connected with the same pipeline networks or excluded by a project.   
The “Rapprochement” Process  
a. From Helsinki U-turn to Cyprus referendum, 1999-2004 
   During the years 1996-1999 the course of bilateral relations played a catalytic 
role in nowadays reconciliation process. The “self-restraint-prudent leadership”12 and 
management of the above mentioned period crises (Imia/Kardak islets13-Abdullah 
Oalan case -Russian S-300 missiles) in both sides formed a new period of 
understanding in Greek-Turkish affairs. Therefore the foreign ministers of Greece and 
Turkey at that time, George A. Papandreou and Ismail Cem introduced a new policy 
of promoting advantageous cooperation on the so-called “low politics” issues.14 Those 
diplomatic efforts encountered mutual suspiciousness and to some extent objections 
over their actual efficiency in the part of political parties, media and civil society in 
Greece and Turkey. Eventually, Imia/Kardak islets dangerous escalation re-fed 
negative stereotypes and mistrust between the two countries.  
Conversely, concerning that new “reality” in bilateral relations, Turkey (in 
August and November 1999) and Greece (September 1999) had experienced 
disastrous earthquakes which caused enormous damages in life and property on both 
                                                            
12 T. A.Couloumbis, A. E. Kentikelenis, op.cit., pp. 518 
13United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) ‐ Article 121. ‐ Regime of Islands. Signed at 
Montego  Bay,  Jamaica,  10  December  1982  and  Entered  into  force  16  November  1994,  see  also 
APPENDIX  I.  (Available  online  from:  http://www.globelaw.com/LawSea/  ls82_3.htm#article_121_ 
regime _ o f_ islands)  
14 “In  this spirit,  the  then Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey agreed  (New York, 30.6.1999)  to 
carry  out  talks  on  the  level  of  high‐ranking  diplomatic  officers  from  the  respective Ministries  of 
Foreign  Affairs  to  examine  possibilities  for  bilateral  cooperation  in  fields  such  as  economy,  trade, 
tourism, environment, culture, multilateral cooperation and combating crime. Following these talks, a 
Greek‐Turkish Steering Committee was set up and convenes once in a year, as do six Working Groups 
composed  of  delegates  from  the  competent  Ministries,  headed  by  Foreign  Ministry  officials.” 
(Available from:http://old.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/bilateral.html) 
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sides of Aegean. Unexpectedly, those natural disasters stimulated unique 
humane/humanistic reflexes among the two societies and “gave birth” to an 
astonishing phenomenon known as “earthquake15 or seismic16 diplomacy”. Mutual aid 
by well-equipped rescuers, doctors, donations and a much more positive outlook by 
media on Greek-Turkish relations reflected a great impact and dramatic change of 
perceptions on both civil societies. An indicative fact of this development was “the 
front-page in Greek ‘Thank You, Friends’ published in the Turkish newspaper 
Milliyet after the 17-hour rescue of a little Turkish boy out of the ruins by a Greek 
rescue team.”17 
Concerning that tremendous experience, Dimitris Kerides states that: 
 “These humanitarian interventions generated considerable goodwill and 
boosted reconciliation efforts under-taken by the leaders of the rival 
nations…Despite a history of border disputes, the natural disasters in 
August and September 1999 demonstrated that the two nations share a 
common geological vulnerability: the enormous rescue and relief 
operations that followed proved that the two peoples can work 
together…What lessons may be learned from the Greek-Turkish 
earthquake diplomacy? Natural disasters can remind quarrelsome 
neighbors of the importance of what unites them rather than what divides 
them.”18  
 
                                                            
15 A. Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin, Greek‐Turkish  relations  in an era of detente  ,  ( USA & Canada, New 
York: New York, Routledge, Taylor and Francis group ,2005), pp.117     
16N. Akiman, op. cit., pp.29    
17 H. –J. Axt, ‘Relations with Turkey and their Impact on the European Union’, Southeast European and 
Black Sea Studies, ROUTLEDGE, TAYLOR AND FRANCIS GROUP, Vol. 5, No 3, September 2005, pp.369  
18 D. Keridis,  ‘Earthquakes, Diplomacy, and New Thinking  in Foreign Policy’, The Fletchers Forum of 
World Affairs, Vol.30, No 1,Winter 2006, pp.209 
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Papandreou and Cem’s sincere policies along with the earthquake’s positive 
bilateral understanding in both countries’ peoples formed the appropriate prerequisites 
for Greece’s U-turn policy to unblock (by abandoning its long-standing strategy of 
veto) Turkey’s European Union candidacy status in the Helsinki European Council 
meeting (December 10th-11th 1999).19 Hence, Greece wouldn’t be the obstacle of 
Turkey’s Europeanization (E.U promise to start the final membership negotiations 
with Turkey at the end of 2004); Turkey shouldn’t continue its expansionist policy 
over Aegean and Cyprus and resolve its dispute(s) with Greece through the 
International Court of Justice in Hague (ICJ) at the latest by the end of 2004 and 
Cyprus accession in E.U shouldn’t interrelated with United Nations efforts for the 
settlement of chronic Cyprus problem. Under this new environment in Greek-Turkish 
relations, the “rapprochement” process invigorated by a set of nine agreements20  
signed by the foreign ministers of Greece (George A. Papandreou) and Turkey (Ismail 
Cem) in Ankara and Athens during January and February 2000.  
                                                            
19  In  APPENDIX  II  are  offered  the  original  articles  from  the  Presidency  Conclusions  of  Helsinki 
European  Council  on  10th  and  11th  December  1999  related  to  Cyprus  and  Turkey  European 
membership procedure; (Available from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm) 
20 Agreement on Cooperation in the field of Tourism (came into force on May 4, 2001), Agreement on 
Economic  Cooperation  (came  into  force  on  November  24,  2001),  Agreement  on  Cooperation  in 
Science and Technology (came into force on May 4, 2001), Agreement on Maritime Transport (came 
into  force  on  August  19,  2001),  Agreement  on  Cultural  Cooperation  (came  into  force  on  July  19, 
2001) , Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Customs Administrations  (came 
into force on June3,2001) , Agreement on reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments(came 
into  force on November 24, 2001) , Agreement on Cooperation on Environmental Protection(came 
into force on June 30, 2001) , Agreement on Combating Crime, especially terrorism, organized crime, 
illicit drug trafficking and illegal immigration (came into force on July 17, 2001)  In implementation of 
this Agreement, a  Readmission Protocol was signed by the then Foreign Ministers G. Papandreou and 
I. Çem in Athens (November 2001).The readmission procedure falls under specific rules agreed upon 
by  the  two  countries  (came  into  force  on  August  5,  2002;(Available  from: 
http://old.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/bilateral.html) 
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Those agreements became the “starting point” of a set of others bilateral 
agreements over a variety of issues concerning political, economic, cultural, military 
army and environmental sectors, especially during the period 2000-200321.  
Greek-Turkish “rapprochement” process (1999-2004) can be examined, 
concerning its applicability, as a case study by Putnam’s “two-level game” theory.22 
According to Putnam’s theory, the process of pragmatic settlement over disputable 
cases among liberal democracies through international negotiations is consisted by 
simultaneous negotiations at both, intra-national level (domestic field) and inter-
national level (between governments).Over intra-national level (LEVEL I) 
negotiations, the  executive authority’s main interest is to build the appropriate 
coalition with the most crucial-influential institutions within society. Political 
opposition, media (TV stations, newspapers etc.), the military and especially public 
opinion have a strong impact on international agreements procedures. On the other 
hand, over inter-national level (LEVEL II) negotiations, the conveyors of the 
authority try to combine discrepancies without breaking of the interests and feelings at 
home. Putnam in order to interpret the route of international negotiations he examined 
the range under which the agreements in LEVEL II (international arena) are 
acceptable by LEVEL I (domestic constituency). This range is known as the win-sets 
                                                            
21  Ibid.,  Along with  others  agreements: At  their meetings  in  Budapest  (October  2000),  the  then 
Foreign Ministers of the two countries agreed to take up and implement a set of Confidence Building 
Measures (CBMs) with a view to establishing a climate of confidence between Greece and Turkey. In 
this context it was agreed that some of these CBMs would be elaborated on within the framework of 
NATO  (under  the  auspices  of  the NATO  Secretary General)  and  others would  be  taken  up  at  the 
bilateral  level  (MFA  Political Directors  level). Within  the  framework  of NATO,  the  two  sides  have 
agreed  in  total on  three  (3) CBMs  and  at  the Political Directors  Level,  the  two  sides have  already 
agreed on eight (8) CBMs.  
22  R.  D.  Putnam,  ‘Diplomacy  and  Domestic  Politics:  The  Logic  of  Two  Level  Games’,  International 
Organization, Vol. 42, No 3 (1988), pp.427‐460   
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and Putnam defined them as “the set of all possible LEVEL II agreements that would 
“win” that gain the necessary majority among the constituents-LEVEL I.23”  
He stated that it is possible to estimate the impact of the domestic factors on 
the success of international negotiations. Furthermore, he hypothesized that the larger 
the win-sets achieved in LEVEL I, the higher the possibility for an international 
agreement and on the contrary the smaller the win-set made in LEVEL I the more 
likely for international negotiation to collapse. As for LEVEL II part, he assumes that 
a smaller win-set in LEVEL II doesn’t automatically mean lack of consensus in 
LEVEL I field even though such a win-set can limit the diplomatic efficiency of the 
state. Moreover, the larger a win-set in LEVEL II can strengthen the position of a 
party but such a win-set is open to stronger pressure by other countries which can 
influence the negotiating process. 
 This political model derived from game theory, provides us with a feasible 
theoretical framework to analyze the Greek-Turkish “rapprochement” process 
background during the period 1999-2004.By basing the research on Putnam’s two-
level game metaphor we can elucidate the circumstances-prerequisites under which 
this procedure has functioned.  
For centuries, nationalistic narratives in both countries shaped a mutual 
distrust and hostility between Greek and Turkish societies. More than eight decades, 
national foreign policy in Greece and Turkey had used to being shaped on that 
doctrine. Ali Çarkoğlu and Kemal Kirişci reported that in democratic, open societies 
elected governments pay serious attention to public opinion’s views in almost any 
political decision and that “[…] decisions that are not supported by the public run the 
                                                            
23Ibid., pp.439 
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risk of undermining the legitimacy of the policies of a popular elected 
government.”24Despite that earthquake diplomacy provided the crucial consensus 
among the civil societies in Greece and Turkey and therefore Papandreou-Cem efforts 
had more chances to be more acceptable for both societies. Mass media which play an 
important role for the formation of public opinion also reflected this reconciliation 
process without reproducing chronic-mutual negative stereotypes. Even, Political 
opposition in both countries despite their ideological differences supported the main 
strategy of “rapprochement”. The philosophy of “rapprochement” confirmed and 
approved by both countries subsequent governments Tayip Erdoğan’s (2002) and K. 
Karamanlis (2004) respectively.  
Finally, as for the military even though its role in Greece and Turkey is 
essentially different, under the influence of politicians and especially through NATO, 
they participated actively in “rapprochement” process as the agreements signed during 
the period 1999-2004 reveal25.Obviously, certain segments of the society in  both 
countries did not see this process as a positive outcome. Despite those reactionary 
forces, Simitis and Mesut Yilmaz (and his successor Bülent Ecevit-January 11th 1999) 
promoted “rapprochement” process by achieving equilibrium among the domestic 
pressures and international pushes. Additionally, it is important to mention that E.U 
along with U.S.A strongly and actively supported this amelioration in Greek-Turkish 
relations. 
As Putnam’s theory offers, LEVEL I AND LEVEL II interactions in Greece 
and Turkey resulted to large win-sets simultaneously in both levels, an outcome that 
                                                            
24 A. Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin, op. cited pp. 119  
25 R. D. Putnam, op. cit. 
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strongly had influenced the negotiations occurred that period and the agreements were 
signed. 
Putnam’s two-level game theory as any theory in international relations is 
open to criticism. However, it provides us with an important aspect of international 
negotiating processes and it seems that offers a feasible theoretical background in 
order to explain in the most reliable way the course of Greek – Turkish bilateral 
relations during the period 1999-2004. 
b. Bilateral relations after Cyprus accession to the E.U, 2004-2007 
Although serious developments occurred in political, economical, cultural etc 
issues during the above mention period, as for the military field, contrary to the 
significant reduce of dogfights in Aegean(1999-2003),Heinz-Jurgen Axt denoted that 
“it was reported that incidents increased in 2003.”26 By trying to examine this shift in 
Turkish policy towards Aegean issue we have to cite how the political climate 
between Greece-Turkey-Cyprus-E.U was in early 2004 onwards.  
 On April 24th 2004, an U.N referendum “Annan Plan for Cyprus”27 took place 
in Cyprus. The two major communities of the island Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-
Cypriots, simultaneously, participated in that referendum either to ratify/accept the 
reunification plan (and establish the “United Cyprus Republic”) or to reject it. Even 
though both communities’ political leaders Tassos Papadopoulos and Rauf Denktaş 
rejected the plan, 76% of Greek-Cypriots voted against and 65% of the Turkish-
                                                            
26 H.‐J. Axt, op. cit., pp.371  
27THE COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM: The documents appended constitute 
the  Comprehensive  Settlement  of  the  Cyprus  Problem  finalized  on  31  March  2004.:  (Available 
in:http://www.unficyp.org/media/Other%20official%20documents/annanplan.pdf) 
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Cypriots voted in favor28.This outcome created remarkable and serious sequential 
events.29 
According to the Helsinki Summit results, on May 1st 2004, the Republic of 
Cyprus joined the European Union as a divided island. The European Union 
welcomed the Republic of Cyprus, which it is considered by U.N as the sole 
legitimate government of the whole island, by stating that:  
“In light of Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty 2003 Cyprus as a whole 
entered the EU, whereas the acquis is suspended in the northern part of the 
island (“areas not under effective control of the Government of the 
Republic of Cyprus”). This means inter alia that these areas are outside the 
customs and fiscal territory of the EU. The suspension has territorial effect, 
but does not concern the personal rights of Turkish Cypriots as EU 
citizens, as they are considered as citizens of the Member State Republic of 
Cyprus.”30 
Obviously, the Republic of Cyprus as a member of EU upgraded its status 
towards Turkey and had the ability to put pressure on Ankara. Henceforth, Turkey’s 
European future had to pass through Nicosia. The new Prime Minister of Greece K. 
Karamanlis, soon after Cyprus joined the EU, declared that Greece’s strategic choice 
to support Turkey’s Europeanization and the rapprochement process remains a central 
political decision of the newly-elected31 Greek government’s foreign policy. Contrary 
to Greece’s declaration, in November 2004, the Cypriot Government stated that 
                                                            
28 See http://mondediplo.com/2004/05/07cyprus. 
29 V. Coufoudakis from American Hellenic Institute‐Washington, DC analyzes the outcome of Annan’s 
Plan  referendum  and  offers  a  brief  annotation  of  the  factors  that  influence  the  final  result.  (For 
further information see: http://hellenicnews.com/readnews.html?newsid=3374&lang=US) 
30 See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkish_cypriot_community/index_en.htm 
31 On 7th March 2004, New Democracy  (ND) won  the Hellenic general elections  instead of  its main 
ideological  opponent  Pan‐Hellenic  Socialistic Movement  (PASOK)  which  was  the  leading  party  in 
Greece for more than a decade. 
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Turkey should implement all its obligations towards Republic of Cyprus in order not 
to block its accession process. 
 Greece’s along with the EU response to Cypriots was on the one hand the 
neutrality of Greek government and on the other hand EU suggestion to Turkey to 
sign a protocol to extend the customs union with the new ten EU members bypassing 
at the same time Cyprus demands. 
Ker-Lindsay argues that, Greece’s foreign policy towards Cyprus issue during 
New Democracy era became less supportive than in the past.: “In October 2005, when 
the Cypriot government decided to stage its annual “Nikiforos” military 
exercise[…]in which Greece had usually participated since 2001[…]Athens made it 
clear that[…]the decision not to participate in the maneuver sent a strong message that  
Athens would not allow Cyprus to shape, let alone destabilize, its relations with 
Turkey.”32 
 The European Council instead, in December 16th -17th 2004 announced that 
Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria and so on October the 3rd 2005, formal 
accession negotiations were ready to start33. Although, in August 2005 the Turkish 
government signed the customs union protocol, at the same time, Turkey refused to 
declare its formal recognition to the Republic of Cyprus arguing that this could 
happen only after the political resolution of Cyprus problem.  
                                                            
32 J. Ker‐Lindsay, ‘Greek‐Turkish Rapprochement under New Democracy’, The International Spectator, 
Routledge, Vol. 42, No.3, London,  (online publication date:01 June 2007), pp.242 
33 In December 2004, the European Council stated that: “The European Council welcomes the decisive 
progress made by Turkey in its far reaching reform process and expressed its confidence that Turkey 
will  sustain  that  process  of  reform  […].  Turkey  sufficiently  fulfils  the  Copenhagen  criteria  to  open 
accession negotiations [...]. The European Council invites the Commission to present to the Council a 
proposal  for  a  framework  for  negotiations with  Turkey with  a  view  to  opening  negotiations  on  3 
October  2005.”  (Available  from:  http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents 
/2005/package/sec_1426_final_progress_report_tr_en.pdf) 
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As a matter of fact, the Annan plan’s failure along with Cyprus’ European 
Union membership and Turkey’s Europeanization process formulate a set of elements 
that destabilize the relations between the four main actors: EU, Cyprus, Greece and 
Turkey.  
It is important to mention that Greece’s U-turn foreign policy towards Turkey 
which was moulded by Simitis and Papandreou efforts had a strategic goal. Greece 
offered its full support to Turkey in order to join EU under the condition that both 
countries would solve their dispute(s) through the International Court of Justice 
before EU-Turkey accession negotiations started. Surprisingly enough, the European 
Commission renounced its obligation under Helsinki Summit to bring the issue to the 
ICJ and its negotiating role to examine the state of bilateral negotiations between 
Greece and Turkey. 
 K. Simitis, the ex-Prime Minister of Greece (1996-2004) and one of the 
architects of Helsinki strategy, in his autobiographical book “Policy for a constructive 
Greece, 1996-2004” accused K. Karamanlis and the New Democracy government of 
abandoning an integrated political strategy that constructively and realistically would 
press for the settlement of the last national abeyance with Turkey. 34 Thus, the 
adjoining deadlock of Greek-Turkish-Cypriot disputes according to their controversial 
and thorny key issues and the results of the Annan Plan and Helsinki Process left 
Greece and Turkey without a sufficient “roadmap”. Greece’s support to the  Turkey’s 
EU accession under New Democracy era and the “rapprochement process” led Athens 
to the assumption that E.U prospect will pressure Ankara to be more flexible and 
                                                            
34 K. Simitis, Πολιτική για μια δημιουργική  Ελλάδα, 1996‐2004 [ Policy for a creative Greece, 1996‐
2004],  (Athens: Polis publications, Athens, 2005), pp. 105 
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through bilateral negotiation both  countries will settle their disputes in ICJ. Athens 
was betting only in Turkey’s volition to continue its European path.  
On the contrary, Turkey continued the violation of Greek airspace and the 
daily dogfights35 and as Ken-Lindsay reveals that: “it would not bargain on its 
positions on the Aegean simply to gain Greek support for E.U membership.”36 
Furthermore, Turkey’s refusal to open its ports and airports to Cypriot (de facto 
recognition of Cyprus Republic) and its reluctance to proceed to the requisite reforms 
led Brussels in November 29th 2006 to freeze 8 chapters of EU-Turkish accession 
negotiations37 until November 2009. An Interview with European Commission 
President José Manuel Barroso on BBC Sunday in London, 15th October 2006 
presents an indicative aspect of how E.U perceives Turkey’s E.U candidacy future. 
Among others he stated that:  
“We cannot expect Turkey to become a member let’s say in less than 
fifteen, twenty years […] In fact we are concerned about Turkey because 
they, the pace of reforms are rather slow from our point of view. So I 
believe it will be great to have Turkey if Turkey respects all the economic 
and political criteria. This is not yet the case […] I believe it’s a country 
that comes from a different tradition. There are efforts in the right 
direction. But nowadays there is in fact news that are not encouraging in 
terms of coming closer to us.”38 
 Deputy FM Yiannis Valinakis echoed Bakoyannis' statement, called the 
report "positive" for issues of particular Greek interest. "The Commission stresses a 
                                                            
35 D. Triantaphyllou, ‘The priorities of Greek Foreign Policy Today’, Southern European and Black Sea 
Studies, ELIAMEP, Sept.2005 pp. 336 
36  J. Ker‐Lindsay, op. cited, pp.244 
37 See http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1652 
38 See http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/pdf/interview_20061015_en.pdf 
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lack of substantive progress on the part of Turkey, whose response towards its 
European commitments has been feeble. We are not happy about this, quite the 
opposite, it concerns us. We want to see a truly European Turkey being included in 
the EU at the conclusion of a successful adaptation with the European acquis." Greek 
diplomacy was pleased with the fact that the EU executive's report directly referred to 
the Greek-Turkish relations in a positive way for Greece.39 
Eventually, during the period 2004-2007, the Greek-Turkish “rapprochement” 
process seemed to lose its initial dynamics.  The collapse in Cyprus’s reunification 
process, Turkey’s reluctance to fulfill EU’s reforms and voices within Europe 
suggesting “privileged –relations” rather than full EU membership for Turkey (such 
the French Prime Minister N. Sarkozi and the German Christian-Democrats) have 
brought tremors in the E.U-Turkish relations and the Greek foreign policy towards 
Turkey’s Europeanization raised serious doubts over its short-term efficiency.  
Moreover the continuation of Turkey’s expansive policy towards the Aegean Sea40 
shows a significant upgrade in the Turkish foreign policy claims due to the Greek-
Turkish dispute(s). This set of factors indicates that the “rapprochement” strategy of 
engagement “[…] did not have any positive suggestions on what should be done when 
things go wrong.”41 From 2004 onwards, the Greek-Turkish dilemmas over issues 
                                                            
39  “...As  regards  Greece,  relations  have  continued  to  develop  positively.  Turkey  should  however 
address any sources of friction with its neighbors and refrain from any action which could negatively 
affect the peaceful settlement of border disputes. Turkey should be unequivocally committed to good 
neighborly relations and to the other requirements against which progress will be measured...” 
(Available from: http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx? office=3 &folder= 
361& article=18841) 
40 On  February 28th 2007,  another  thorny  incident brought  to  the  surface  the  Turkish  “grey  zones 
theory” claim. The Turkish Air Marshal Balini informed the American Wing Commander of NATO’s Air 
force Li MacFan  that, Ai Stratis  [Agios Eustrarios or Ai   Stratis  is a Greek  island  in Northern Aegean 
near  Limnos island] had to be excluded of the  NATO’s exercise “Tolmiros Toksotis” while he claimed 
that    “Ai  Stratis  is  a  demilitarized  area”.  (Available  from:  the  Greek  newspaper  Eleftherotypia, 
27/02/2007)      
41  K. Ifantis, ‘Greece’s Turkish Dilemmas: There and Back Again…’, Southeast European and Black Sea 
Studies, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Ltd, Vol. 5, No 3, September 2005, pp. 390 
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such as Cyprus and the Aegean revived and new dimensions in the bilateral relations 
like the energy security and pipeline diplomacy came to the surface. During the period 
2004-2007, Greek-Turkish “rapprochement” process lost its effectiveness and, even 
though both countries intensified their energy cooperation that period (the realization 
of TGI Interconnector signifies this outcome), it seems that their bilateral relations 
demoted to the level of a détente than “rapprochement”42. 
As a result, Putnam’s “two level game” theory applies only to the period 1999-
2004 and offers the theoretical framework in order to realize the preconditions and 
further developments which engaged the “rapprochement” process period in the 
Greek-Turkish bilateral relations. As long as Putnam’s “two level game theory” 
examines the process of pragmatic settlement through international negotiations 
among two states over disputable issues is not applicable to study the period 2004-
2007 for two main reasons. First of all, over international level (LEVEL II) the 
appropriate consensus that “rapprochement” provided between the two governments 
to resolve their dispute(s) lost its efficiency due to the resurgence of conflicting issues 
in Cyprus and the Aegean sea and, additionally because energy security policy - 
cross-border pipeline diplomacy includes multiple actors and combines geographical, 
political, economical and security attributes which cannot be explained solely through 
the interaction among the international and intra-national  levels in Greece and 
Turkey. 
Thus, it is a fact that “even if skeptical of the way in which rapprochement is 
unfolding, few in Greece believe that a return to the old, pre-1999, approach would 
                                                            
42  This is the reason why we use (even in the essay’s topic) the word “rapprochement” in quotation‐
marks.  
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yield any results.”43 Therefore, how this process of reconciliation will influence the 
energy security policy-pipeline diplomacy in Greece and Turkey and how those 
developments will affect the Greek-Turkish relations? By examining the energy 
security policy-pipeline diplomacy on each country we have the opportunity to 
provide us with the external and internal dynamics which formed the Greek and 
Turkish agenda over energy geopolitics and underline which domestic and 
international factors played a significant role to recent period “chessboard” of oil and 
natural gas pipeline projects in Eurasia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
43  J. Ker‐Lindsay, op. cit., pp.246 
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Part II: The importance of Energy security policy in modern foreign 
politics -theoretical framework 
a. Geopolitics as a field of international relations theory 
In the aftermath of W.W.II, the idea of sharing Europe to easter-supporter 
regions of Soviet Union and western-supporter regions under the influence of United 
Kingdom/U.S.A first appeared on October 9th 1944 in a meeting in Moscow between 
Churchill and Stalin.44 
 The Yalta Conference, which was held in Crimea among the three big powers 
between 4-11 February 1945, corroborated the efforts of those two major ideological 
blocks, both victorious in the war, to establish a consensus among their spheres of 
interest and was the cornerstone of the bipolar system. Bipolarity, as a global structure 
managed to survive more than four decades and symbolized a period under which 
world affairs were balancing between two radically different systems of values and 
principles. The catastrophic repercussions of W.W.II led both blocks to exercise more 
realistic policies over international relations and gave birth to the term “Cold War”. 
On February 1947, the President of the United States H. Truman announced that the 
US government would take the responsibility to offer aid to Greece and Turkey. 
Officially, Greece and Turkey passed under the US zone of influence45. 
                                                            
44 “They agreed that after the release of Balkans from the German occupation, Romania and Bulgaria 
would pass  in  the  Soviet  sphere of  influence while Greece  in British. As  for Yugoslavia, where  the 
British had helped the partisans of Tito against the Germans, and Hungary the decision of two leaders 
was to be shared equally.”(Available from: http://www.tovima.gr/default.asp?pid =2&ct= 83 & artid = 
154794) 
45  “On Friday, February 21, 1947,  the British Embassy  informed  the U.S. State Department officials 
that Great Britain  could no  longer provide  financial aid  to  the governments of Greece and Turkey. 
American  policymakers  had  been  monitoring  Greece's  crumbling  economic  and  political 
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 The collapse of Soviet Union subverted Yalta’s agreements and shifted the 
then existing global balance of power. As a result, the terms geopolitic and 
geostrategic obtained new dimensions and range. Even though they allow for multiple 
definitions and interpretations as terms, many scholars consider them as synonymous. 
 The term geopolitics first appeared in 1904 by Rudolf Kjellen, a Swedish 
geographer which tried to describe the geopolitical basis of the power of a state.46As a 
matter of fact, there have been many attempts to define the term geopolitics. Its 
meaning tends to alter due to the changes occurred to international dynamics during 
different historical periods. 
 By examining the different ways that geopolitics is approached, we are trying 
to explore the link between geopolitics/geo-strategies and energy security policy, 
within modern terms lens.  
 Sir Halford Mackinder, a British historian, in his work “Democratic Ideas and 
Reality”, noted that the one “[w]ho controlled East Europe [in effect Aegean Sea and 
the wider East Mediterranean region, Greece and Turkey] could control the extensive 
sources of the Heartland (Eurasia) and could thereby dominate the world.”47 He 
referred to the importance of geography and especially to the morphological 
characteristics such as straits, rivers canals etc and how the possession of natural 
resources (especially hydrocarbons, gold and water) lends multiple powers to states.  
O’ Hara, based on Mackinder’s “Heartland theory” argued that in modern 
terms, the one “[w]ho controls the export routes, controls the oil and gas; by 
                                                                                                                                                                          
conditions…When  Britain  announced  that  it  would  withdraw  aid  to  Greece  and  Turkey,  the 
responsibility was  passed  on  to  the  United  States.”(Available  from:  http://www.trumanlibrary.org 
/teacher/doctrine.htm 
46 See http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/319825/Rudolf‐Kjellen 
47 H. J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideas and Reality,1919, (New York: Norton W. W., New York, , 1962),  
pp. 150  
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controlling oil and gas, controls the Heartland.”48 Therefore, the one who dominates 
the wider Caucasus-Caspian and Black Sea region (Eurasia), will be the global 
overlord. Furtermore J. Gottman offers a concise definition for geopolitics as “the 
study of the influence of geographical factors on political action”49 
 Despite the fact that, Soviet Union collapsed and “new order” prevailed, 
Zbigniev Brzezinski, in line with Mackinder’s theory argued that Eurasia (Heartland) 
has become the key region to world’s power. “This area had become ‘geopolitically 
significant’ given its sociopolitical instability and its energy resources and it was thus 
in the primary interest of the United States to ensure that no single power should 
control this ‘geopolitical space’.”50Actually, Brzezinski’s assumptions relied on U.S 
concerns over the neo-Eurasian supporters in Russia whose policies - possession and 
domination of hydrocarbon reserves, a doctrine built up on the imperialist and Soviet 
past - were to resurrect a new-Soviet political entity to control the Eurasian region51. 
However, as Gareth Winrow suggests, “one may contend that term covers the 
relationship between the conduct of foreign policy, political power and the physical 
environment, in which there is a need to take into account inter geographical location; 
the relations between states usually within a particular region and the distribution of 
natural resources.”52 
 In other words, geopolitics, a term which has its roots in Political Geography, 
is the method under which we can examine the interaction between geographical and 
                                                            
48 S.L. O’Hara, ‘Great game or grubby game? The struggle for control of the Caspian’ Geopolitics 9, No 
1, 2004, pp 138‐160 
49 J. Gottman, ‘The background of geopolitics’, Military Affairs 6, No 4, 1942, pp. 197‐206 
50 Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primary and Its Geostrategic Imperatives,(New York: 
New York, Basic Books, 1997) 
51M.  Bassin,  ‘The  two  faces  of  contemporary  geopolitics’,  Progress  in  Human  Geography  28,No 
5,2004, pp. 620‐626 
52G. Winrow, ‘Geopolitics and Energy Security in the Wider Black Sea Region’, Southern European and 
Black Sea Studies, ELIAMEP, Vol. 7, No 2, June 2007, pp.218 
34 
 
political edifice, in order for a state/international body(EU-NATO) to ensure their 
strategic power (geo-strategy) or/and their economic power (geo-economy). 
 Eventually, the two crucial dimensions of world politics, strategy-military 
power and economy as statecraft, are embodied in geopolitics. Thus, even though 
geo-strategy etymologically has the same first synthetic word ‘geo’ with geopolitics, 
is more a component of the latter than a synonym. 
 At this point, it is important to examine how geopolitics and energy security 
policy interact and are interdependent in modern global politics. 
b. Energy security policy- definitions analysis and terminology clarification  
 Energy security policy first became known as a concept during and after the 
Arab-Israeli War in 1973, following the impact of the first oil crisis. The 
establishment of the International Energy Agency (IEA) a year later (1974) reveals 
the agony and vulnerability of the major industrialized countries regarding future 
disorder of access to energy supplies. 
 In the early 1980s the term ‘resource war’ was initially introduced in the 
United States, a fact that reflected in David Baldwin’s definition of energy security 
(1985). “The enhancement of energy security power was defined as the control of: 
I. Exploitable reserves; 
II. Net export capacity; 
III. Transportations routes; and 
IV. Pricing mechanisms (price elasticity) of hydrocarbon resources,53 
                                                            
53 D. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft,(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 65 
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 have been vital security challenges for all nations since the complete mechanization 
of their armed forces54 and the mature industrialization of their economies.”55 
Subsequently, in the post-Cold War era, Klare suggests that “a new geography 
of conflict has developed in which resource flows, instead of ideological and political 
and political divisions, form the main fault lines” 56 and points out the crucial linkage 
between the security of energy consumers and the safety of resource passages through 
energy states as long as the growing mutual dependence among energy suppliers and 
energy consumers.  
As for Barton, he perceives energy security, “as a condition in which citizens 
and businesses have access to sufficient energy recourses at reasonable prices for the 
foreseeable future free from serious risk of major disruption of service.”57 
It seems that energy security policy is a critical factor of the overall power 
status of a nation and a powerful instrument of effective and forceful national policy-
making. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), of which (Greece and Turkey have been founding members since 1961), “up 
to around 2020, energy use will continue to be largely dominated by fossil fuels. Oil 
will be driven mainly by transport need, and by the fact that oil will remain the 
                                                            
54 See also: Vaclav Smil, Energy at the crossroads, Global perspectives and uncertainties, Energy and 
War, ( London: The MIT Press, Gambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 2005), pp. 116‐120   
55 T. Tsakiris,  ‘Energy Security Policy as Economic Statecrafts, A Historical Overview of  the Last 100 
Years’, Agora without Frontiers: Institute of International Economical Relations, Vol. 9, No 4, Athens, 
March‐April‐May 2004, pp.308 
56 M.T. Klare, ‘The new geography of conflict’, Foreign Affairs 81, No 3, 2001 , pp.49‐61 
57 B. Barton, C. Redwell, A. Ronne, and D.N. Zillman, Energy Security: Managing Risk  in a Dynamic 
Legal and Regulatory Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2004)  
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“swing” energy[…] Use of gas will grow rapidly as the preferred fuel for heating, 
process use and power generation.”58  
The combination of the above mention realities, energy security policy- 
domination of hydrocarbons (oil and gas) in the global energy market, stresses two 
interrelated conditions: the growing interdependence among producer-transit-
consumer states; and the need for diversification of energy sources and energy supply 
routes. Hence, oil and gas pipeline projects and their potential routes and 
interconnections became top priority and the foundation stone on which modern 
energy security policy and broader geopolitics functioned in 21st century. 
Gaël Raballand and Ferhat Esen suggest in their article that, cross-border 
pipelines face three main obstacles. (i) The existing of multiple parties, with different 
interests, are involved in a pipeline project; (ii) The absence of overarching legal 
jurisdiction to police and regulate activities and contracts; and (iii) The creation of 
profit and rent by the projects, which must be shared among various parties.59 
Therefore, cross – border pipelines from landlocked states involves transit through 
at least one other state, a fact that complicates even more the legal and financial 
dimensions of pipeline projects. Thus, they cannot be examined through strictly 
economic terms. 
Emmanuel Karagiannis points out also that, “the location of the oil reserves 
has historically made foreign investors dependent on international pipelines to carry 
the oil to markets[…]the pipeline question is more than just economic problem; rather 
                                                            
58 R.  Lahidji, W. Michalski  and B.  Stevens,  The  Long‐term  future  for  Energy: An Assessment of  key 
Trends  and  Challenges, OECD  [Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development],    (Paris, 
France, 1999), pp.8  
59 G. Raballand, F. Esen, ‘Economics and politics of cross‐border oil pipelines—the case of the Caspian 
basin’ , Springer‐Verlag online publication, October 2006 
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it has security and geopolitical nature. Pipelines […] do not simply carry oil [and gas], 
but also define new corridors of trade and power.”60 Moreover, Winrow marks out the 
interlinked with cross- border pipeline projects, importance of energy transit states. 
He argues that, “… [t]ransit states could […] illegally tap into the pipelines to satisfy 
their own energy needs. Legal and environmental issues may further complicate the 
picture concerning energy transportation.”61 
Interestingly enough, even though energy security policy as a field of 
geopolitics is not a particularly recent tool of statecraft, pipeline diplomacy instead 
presents a radically new “autonomous” spectrum in international relations which 
cannot be examined solely in terms of modernity and geopolitics theory. It integrates 
elements of nation-state structure, bipolarity and globalization which are amalgamated 
in modern-international relations arena’s-versatility.62          
          
     
  
 
 
                                                            
60 E. Karagiannis, Energy Security in the Caucasus, (London: RoutledgeCurzon, Taylor & Francis Group, 
London ,2002), pp. 179  
61 G. M. Winrow, ‘Energy Security in the Black Sea – Caspian Region’, Journal of International Affairs, 
Perceptions, Vol. 5, No 3, Ankara, 2005, pp. 89  
62  The  initial  topic  and  range  of  this  essay  doesn’t  allow  us  for  further  examination  on  pipeline 
diplomacy as an ‘autonomous’ field in international relations theory. 
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Part III: Greek and Turkish energy security policy-pipeline 
diplomacy cases 
A. The Greek case 
1. Greece’s energy security policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
Balkans regions 
The East Mediterranean region comprises a unique geographical, political, 
economic, military and strategic crossroad. Eastern Mediterranean basin extends from 
Sicily to Suez Canal. Eastern Mediterranean countries, from West to East, are: Italy, 
Greece, ex-Yugoslav Republics, Albania, Turkey, Libya, Israel, Syria, Lebanon and 
Egypt. It connects three continents (Europe, Asia, and Africa) and combines a variety 
of civilizations from South-Eastern Europe, Balkan Peninsula, North Africa, the 
Black Sea region and the Middle East. 
Especially Greece and Turkey - along with the Republic of Cyprus - possess 
the majority of geostrategic routes in the region. Through Dardanelle-Bosporus straits 
and its natural extension of Aegean Sea-Crete and Cyprus, crucial paths of energy and 
natural sources transportation are extended from Middle Eastern and Caucasian 
countries to Black Sea region and Western economies. Nowadays we can assume that 
Aegean Sea as an energy gate can be as important as the Suez Canal  was five decades 
ago. 
The geopolitical and geostrategic game of gas and oil pipeline projects which 
will transfer hydrocarbons from Eurasia to Western consumers directly influences 
crucial geostrategic dimensions of Greece. 
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Greece is a member in numerous international organizations such as: North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization- NATO; (1952) Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development-OECD; (1961) International Energy Treaty-IEA; (1977) European 
Economic Community-EEC;63 (1981) Black Sea Economic Cooperation-BSEC; 
(1992) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe-OSCE;64 (1995). 
Greece’s membership in many international bodies related with energy issues along 
with its geostrategic advantages potentially can render it as a key regional player (as a 
transit state) in European energy security. 
Conversely, Greece’s limited market and geographical position as the 
southernmost country in Europe, limits Greece from being the intermediate link 
between North-South Europe. Despite those weaknesses Greece still manages to play 
a crucial role in the Balkan Peninsula and Southeast Europe. 
After the fall of the military junta in 1974, Greece’s strategic choice to be a 
member in the European Economic Community (1981) stemmed from the country’s 
need to protect its northern and eastern boarders from its unstable and hostile 
neighbors (mainly Turkey). Furthermore, D.Triantaphyllou argues that “Greece’s 
anchoring in the EU took place because it was precisely touted domestically as 
guarantor of the country’s frontiers and interests where the term ‘status quo’ still 
plays a dominant part in the day-to-day psyche of European foreign policy-
making”.65The necessity for further political and economical (structural) reforms 
became the “weak part” for all Greek governments since EEC’s accession. Greece’s 
problematic foreign policy priorities and socio-economic indicators led the 
                                                            
63 After the Treaty of Maastricht (November 1st , 1993), EEC renamed as European Union‐EU   
64 On  July 1973,  the Conference of Security and Co‐operation  in Europe‐ CSCE was established. On 
January 1st renamed as OSCE. (See also: http://www.osce.org/) 
65 D. Triantaphyllou, ‘The priorities of Greek Foreign Policy Today’, Southern European and Black Sea 
Studies, ELIAMEP, Sept.2005 pp.328 
40 
 
international community and press to characterize the country as “the black sheep of 
the European Union”.66 
Overall and especially during the last fifteen years Greece, by adopting the 
Maastricht criteria and by supporting Balkan states such as Bulgaria, Romania and 
Slovenia67  to join the EU and NATO (in order to extent European and North-Atlantic 
Alliance integration in the region),managed to enlarge the country’s ‘strategic space’ 
and strengthen its financial, political and security status. Greece’s membership in the 
European and Monetary Union (2002) and the 2004 successful Olympic Games 
organization showed that Greece is a decent state in the international and the 
European Union’s stage. 
Greece still plays an active role in the Balkan’s reconstruction and political 
reform. As for the energy sector since 1999, many Greek companies68 related to 
energy sector such as, gas and oil stations, storages and oil products exportation have 
been invested in Balkan countries. Furthermore, Greece is one of the five 
Southeastern European states that is crude oil and gas producer. According to 
Myrianthis, “Romania accounts for 61 percent of output and 78 percent of reserves, 
and Turkey produces 31 percent and has 13 percent of reserves. Albania has 8 percent 
of reserves, and Greece-Bulgaria both hold 0.7 percent. Southeastern Europe’s 
reserve/production ratio is 25 years.”69 The deposits in Kavala, Prinos and North 
                                                            
66 Ibid., pp.331  
67 In 2004 Slovenia joined EU and three years later, on January 1st 2007 Bulgaria and Romania joined 
too.  
68 Direct  investments close to 14 billion euro with approximately 200.000 executives. See Mikhail. L.  
Myrianthis,  ‘H  ενεργειακή  παρουσία  της  Ελλάδας  στα  Βαλκάνια, H  χώρα  μαs  ενεργειακόs  κόμβος 
στήν  περιοχή, Bαλκάνια,  Σκόπια‐[FYROM],  Κόσσοβο,  “Μεγάλη”  Αλβανία, O  ανταγωνισμός  Ρωσίας‐
HΠΑ’[Energy  presence  of  Greece  in  the  Balkans,  Our  country  an  energy  hub  in  the  region,  THE 
Balkans, Scopje‐ [FYROM], Kossovo, ‘Great Albania’, the competition between Russia and the USA] H 
Kathimerini, special edition magazine, Athens 20th April 2008 pp.36 
69 F. –L. Altmann, John Lampe, Energy and the Transformation Process in Southeast Europe, (Gütersloh 
:Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, Gütersloh, 2000), pp.183 
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Prinos which were discovered during the period 1972-1996, had already produced 112 
millions of oil barrels (Prinos and North Prinos) and around 850 mcm (million cubic 
meters) of natural gas (Kavala) during that time.70 
Especially MAMIDOIL and AVIN companies are active in Albania, Serbia, 
Bulgaria, Romania and FYROM having subsidiary branches in the whole Balkan 
district since the 1980’s.Moreover Ellinika Petrelaia-ELPE (Hellenic Petroleum) 
Group has a leading role in the region as the owner of 252 refineries. It owns OKTA 
refinery in FYROM, facilities in Durres (Albania), in the Montenegrin city of Mbar 
and in two airports.71 
As for the public sector, the main tool of Greek energy policy is DEPA 
(ΔΕΠΑ) which was established in 1988, as a subsidiary company of DEP (ΔΕΠ) and 
after its reorganization it entered the stock market as “Hellenic Petroleum” by 
transferring its 85% of his prime capital to the Greek Public sector.72  
During the period 1995-2005, domestic energy sources were between 9.7-
10.28 million tonnes of oil equivalent73-Mtoe  when at the same period the amount of 
imported energy supplies were between 22.3-30.5Mtoe.Moreover, the average annual 
energy growth rate was 2.3%.  Oil and lignite covered more than 85% (57% oil-29% 
lignite in 2005) of the total energy consumption when at the same time natural gas 
consumption increased from 0.14Mtoe(0.6%-1995) to 2.35Mtoe(7.6%-2005).74Greek 
dependency on imported energy products was 75%, mainly because of the imported 
oil and natural gas. The rate between imported and exported energy sources is 3:1, 
with a tendency to increase the following years. 
                                                            
70 See http://www.hellenic‐petroleum.gr/Uploads/resource  
71 M. L. Myrianthis, op. cit., pp.36 
72 See www.rae.gr/SUB3/3B/3b2.htm 
73 Lignite is the most important domestic energy source in Greece. 
74 See http://portal.kathimerini.gr/4Dcgi/4dcgi/_w_articles_kathextra_15_17/09/2007_203870 
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Until 2005 Greek Energy power system was composed by the following 
energy products75 (per energy source)76:  
Oil and Petroleum products 
 Greece imported crude oil and petroleum products from Russia (32.3%), Saudi 
Arabia (31.1%) and Iran (28.6%). At the same time, it exported petroleum products in 
countries like the USA, Turkey, Libya and Syria. The total exports of petroleum 
products were close to 4.8 million tons in 2005. A small layer of oil in Northern 
Greece covers 0.5% of the total demand. 
Natural Gas 
 The total demand of country in natural gas is covered by imports being 
transferred from Russia (85%), via Bulgaria, and, in liquefied form (LNG), natural 
gas from Algeria (15%). In 2005, the total imports of natural gas amounts were 2.8 
bcm and 3.1 bcm in 2006. The Greek natural gas industry is controlled by the Public 
Gas Corporation of Greece (DEPA), which is owned by the Greek Government (65%) 
and Hellenic Petroleum (35%).77 
 Under those circumstances it is important to examine how the current structure 
of Greek energy networks is, and which are the present and future oil/gas pipeline 
projects. Obviously Greece’s case differs from Turkey’s (which will be presented 
further down - chapter C). Greece is not self-sufficient in covering its energy needs, 
plus its foreign policy, and its energy policies are aligned with those of the EU 
(although the actual present dependency of Greece, on gas, is minimal in comparison 
                                                            
75 As we mentioned before the aim of this paper  is to examine oil and natural gas energy resources 
which have the ability to get transferred through pipeline networks  (oil and natural gas).That’s why 
we focus our interest on their importance in Greek energy sector. 
76 See http://news.pathfinder.gr/greece/news/419956.html 
77 Available at : http://www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/LNG_in_Europe.pdf, pp.12  
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to the majority of the EU states78). Nevertheless, over the past decade (give or take) 
Greece started conducting a ‘semi-independent’ (in terms of current needs and future 
interests for expansion of the energy orientated projects) energy policy. All the same, 
Greece was, and still is open to new plans for solving its existing disputes (EU’s and 
Greece’s official stance on the matter has been ‘peaceful settlement of disputes’79) 
with neighboring states (such as Turkey); and energy policy is a way to overcome 
several points of argument, and give up older course of action and strategies that 
brought limited results and progress in the bilateral relations of the two states. 
 
2. Energy networks, present and future oil/gas pipeline projects80 in Greece 
 
PETROLEUM  
The imported oil is shipped from foreign oil terminals to refineries of Greek 
oil companies like ELDA (ΕΛΔΑ) in Aspropyrgos, MOTOR OIL HELLAS in Agioi 
Theodoroi, and PETROLA in Elefsina; and, EKO in Thessaloniki.81 
 
VARDAX oil pipeline from Thessaloniki-Skopje82: Hellenic Oil Group owns 
VARDAX oil pipeline (240km with transportation capacity up to 2.5Mtoe) which 
connects OKTA with ELPE facilities in Thessaloniki (2001)83 
                                                            
78 That determines the current EU’s energy policy.  
79 Available online at: http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en‐US/The+Ministry /Structure/ Mission+ and 
+ Competences/ 
80 See APPENDIX III, Index I 
81 See http://www.rae.gr/SUB3/3B/3b1.htm 
44 
 
 
Bourgas (Bulgaria) - Alexandroupolis (Greece) or Trans-Balkan oil pipeline: In 2007, 
Russia, Bulgaria and Greece agreed to participate in this project. This pipeline will 
consist of 286km, 42 inch perimeter and with 35Mtoe capacity84. The pipeline 
capacity can be expanded to carry 50 million tons in total every year. It will cost from 
800 million euro (35-million-ton capacity) to 900 million euro (50-million-ton 
capacity). Two storage areas will also be built to stock up to 650,000 cubic meters of 
oil in Burgas and up to 450,000 cubic meters of oil in Alexandroupolis.85 It considers 
being as an alternative Bosporus bypass project and an attempt to ease the traffic 
burden of Turkish Straits.  It will transfer oil from Russia. It is supposed to start 
constructed in 201086.  
 
NATURAL GAS 
Yamal - Europe gas pipeline from Russia via Bulgaria: Approximately 6 bcm are 
being transferred from the main high pressure gas transmission pipeline in Yamal 
peninsula (Russia) through the Greek-Bulgarian borders (one of its multiple branches) 
to Attica (Elefsina)87.It is a “megaproject” inspired by Gazprom (Russia) in 1992.In 
1993-1994 Intergovernmental Agreements were signed between Russia with Belarus, 
Poland and Germany and were commissioned in 1999. On December 1994, EU 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
82 See Chapter B.1 
83 M. L. Myrianthis, op.cit, pp.36 
84 F. ‐L. Altmann, John Lampe, op. cit., pp.187 
85See  http://www.bridge‐mag.com/magazine/index.php  ?option=com_content&task  =view&id=  111 
& Ite mid =39 
86 http://www.imerisia.gr/article.asp?catid=13901&subid=2&tag=9490&pubid=6551133 
87 Regulatory Authority for Energy, “Report on the security of natural gas supply in Greece, According 
to the provisions of article 4 of Law 3428/2005,conserning the Liberation of the Natural Gas Market”, 
Athens, January 2009. 
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(Energy Charter Conference in Lisbon) put Yamal - Europe pipeline88 in the list of its 
priority investments, as part of the Trans-European Network. The pipeline delivers 
Russian gas, is 4.100km long and has 33bcm annual capacity (since 2005).89 
LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) terminal facility in Revythousa: (Megara-Attika-
1999).In November 18th 1999 after 12 years of construction the first jetty started to 
function in DEPA facilities in Revythousa from Libya. This project costs almost 300 
million euro and consists a strategic investment cause it has the ability to provide the 
Greek energy market with 84 mcm of natural gas during high-peak demand 
periods90.In 2007 an upgrade in Revythousa’s facilities which allowed its 
provisioning to reach 13mcm daily91, when at the same period the daily national needs 
are close to 9 mcm. 
Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) Interconnector natural gas pipeline92: It transports   non-
Russian natural gas supplies from Azerbaijan and in the future from Iran and 
Turkmenistan. It is expected to increase its capacity level from 0.75 bcm in 2007 to 
12 bcm in 2012. Greece will receive up to 3 bcm, Turkey 1.75 bcm and the remaining 
will flow to Italy (2012) .EU financed 40 per cent of the Interconnector’s costs. It will 
complete in two phases: 
a) Baku – Karacabey – Komotini first pipeline’s branch, 285km long, of which 
200km on Turkish and 85 on Greek territory (2007). 
                                                            
88 First stage‐ 1,489 kilometers of pipeline (initiation 1998–1999): Astrakhan Oblast‐261.8 kilometers 
(1998–1999);  Orlov  Oblast‐1,011.2  kilometers;(1998–1999)  ;Lipetsk  Oblast‐216  kilometers  (1997–
2001); and  its Second stage‐2,793 kilometers of pipeline  (initiation 2000–2002): Astrakhan Oblast—
1,400  kilometers  (2000–2001)  Orlov  Oblast‐1,108  kilometers  (2000–2001)  Kursk  Oblast,  Fatezh 
region‐195 kilometers (2002) Altai Krai‐90 kilometers (2002). Available from: http: //www.stroytransg 
az.com/projects/russia/gas_supply_systems  
89 See http://en.rian.ru/russia/20071101/86223448.html 
90  See  http://www.tovima.gr/default.asp?pid=2&artid=116320&ct=3  I.  N.  Grigoriadis,  ‘Natural  Gas 
Corridors in Southeastern Europe and European Energy Security’, ELIAMEP thesis, July 2008, pp.1 
91 See http://www.protothema.gr/content.php?id=21225 
92 I. N. Grigoriadis, ‘Natural Gas Corridors in Southeastern Europe and European Energy Security’, 
ELIAMEP thesis, July 2008, pp.1 
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b) Stavrolimenas (Thesprotia) – Otranto (Italy) second pipeline’s branch, a 
212km long undersea pipeline [131 mile long is the undersea part] which will 
connect the networks of Greece and Italy (under construction from 2008- 
future completion date 2012).  
Its total cost will be approximately €2.8 billion, the first branch completed in 2007 
and by 2012 (expected completion date for second branch) it will have 12bcm 
capacity transportation93. 
South Stream natural gas pipeline of Russian origin94: the southern branch of undersea 
Blue Stream (2001-2005).This is a 900km long undersea pipeline project (2000meters 
deep), with 31bcm annual planned capacity (10bcm to its southern branch), pipeline 
will depart from the Russian terminal in Beregovaya (Black Sea) to the Bulgarian 
coast in Burgas. Last projected cost is €12.8 billion. Its north-western branch is 
supposed to pass through Bulgaria, Romania, Austria and north Italy (it might expand 
to Serbia, Bosnia and Slovakia). On April 2008 relevant agreements were signed in 
Moscow by Greek Prime Minister and Russian officials. Moreover, on June 24th, 
during the BSEC Meeting held in Istanbul, K.Karamanlis and Vladimir Putin agreed 
on the Greek participation in South Blue Stream (south-western branch) which it is 
suppose to start constructed in 2009 and will connect the Russian refineries with gas 
terminals from Bulgaria, across Greece (Alexandroupolis), the Ionian Sea and will 
reach south Italy (potential completion between 2013-2015)95.Its cost is estimated to 
be close to €8billion96. 
                                                            
93 See http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav032509a.shtml, see also : http: // 
cambridgeforecast.wordpress.com/2008/02/10/turkey‐greece‐italy‐gas‐pipeline/ 
94  Z.  Baran,  ‘Security  Aspects  of  the  South  Stream  Project’,  Center  for  the  Eurasian  Policy  (CEP), 
Hudson Institute, October 2008, pp. 1‐44  
95 Supra, I. N. Grigoriadis pp.3 
96 See http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,625697,00.html 
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3. Third party (EU-USA-Russia) role in Greece’s energy security policy-
pipeline diplomacy  
 Greece’s membership in the EU and NATO entails benefits as well as certain 
obligations. The international institutions in which Greece is a member, promote 
policies that serve their own strategic interests. The energy sector is not an exception. 
Consequently, any attempt to examine Greek energy policy and pipeline diplomacy 
without considering the role of the above mention institutions, is impossible. 
 In order to analyze the degree in which third party involvement define the 
Greek energy policy and pipeline diplomacy, we have to analyze the sequel of factors 
and events which formulate the multilateral relations between “European Greece” 
with EU-USA-Russia due to energy sector issues. Greece is in the center of EU-
Russia-USA triangle of conflicting interests and recent international developments 
reveal that Athens is more vulnerable to external pressures than before. None the less 
new opportunities and challenges are to be considered.  
The Greek Europeanization process started to function in a more complex world 
order and a radically different geopolitical and geostrategic environment for Greece 
and Europe itself. A set of events during the period 2000-2007 have stigmatize the 
route of EU (Greece)- USA and Russian relations which led to sufficient shifts in 
European and Greek energy policies: 
- Russian presidential elections in 2000 which brought to power Vladimir Putin 
as president of the Russian Federation. 
- The US election of 2000 which brought to power Bush’s  administration 
- September 11th 2001 terroristic attacks in USA 
- American response to terrorism and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq(2002) 
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- EU’s enlargement and endorsement (EU-27) of twelve (south) Eastern 
European (2004) and Balkan states (2007). 
- NATO’s integrating process in Balkans and East Europe  
- The Russo-Ukrainian crisis over natural gas supplies from Russia to Ukraine 
and Central Europe(2006) 
In the aftermath of September 11th event and U.S invasion in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, Euro-American relations have become less correlated. The EU’s main interests 
were its constitutional and structural re-shaping. EU’s “eastern” expansion and its 
willingness to form Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 2006 are crucial 
indicators for us to examine and analyze under which circumstances the EU has 
implemented its energy security policies and pipeline diplomacy. Nevertheless, G. 
Demestichas argues that, “[…]EU cannot play a decisive role in world affairs…to the 
extent that the EU countries play a role, they do so unilaterally, or more likely they 
support US [as the world’s sole superpower after the Soviet Union’s demise] 
initiatives.”97 September 11th events and the US foreign policy have undermined the 
U.N and EU, the two most basic institutions on which Athens based its national and 
institutional interests.  
On the other hand, Russia is a leading energy producer and exporter. “[A]s 
percentages of the world’s total reserves, it holds some 45 per cent of gas, 23 per cent 
of coal, 14 per cent of uranium and 13 per cent of the oil.”98 Russia’s privileged 
position as both a supplier and transit country provides it as an alternative for EU 
market from Middle Eastern energy dependence. Moreover, Vladimir Putin’s election, 
                                                            
97 G. Demestichas, ‘Greek Security and Defense Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean’, Mediterranean 
Quarterly, vol. 8, No.2, 1997, pp. 216 
98 A. Monaghan, ‘Russia’s Energy Diplomacy: A Political Idea Lacking a Strategy?’, Southeast European 
and Black Sea Studies, Routledge, Vol. 7,No. 2,June 2007, pp.275 
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underlined that the most hegemonic and meta-communistic philosophy seemed to 
prevail among the Russian policy makers. It also indicates that the ruling role of 
Russia has to be maintained not only in the Federation but also in the vital zone 
consisted by the post-Soviet Union’s geographical frame.99 Under the Putin’s 
presidency, private Russian energy companies were being nationalized like the gas 
giant Gazprom which is 51 per cent state-own.  
The President of Russia became the symbol of a new era in Russia’s foreign 
and energy policy and personified Russia’s further political and financial strategies. 
Energy and pipeline diplomacy became the new tool of Moscow to revive its meta-
Soviet hegemony and influence the broader Eurasian area. As a matter of fact, Russia 
considers Caspian Sea due to its geophysical characteristics as a “closed lake” and 
recognizes the right to the rest coastal States (Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan) to retain their national territorial waters in ten nautical miles from their 
coasts while the rest considered being a “free zone” for exploitation.  
Gareth M. Windrow pointed out that, “[i]t will be seen that the authorities in 
Moscow are making extensive use of energy companies as instrument of Russian 
foreign policy in order to maintain and expand Russia’s influence and presence […] 
This increasingly close linkage between energy business and state authorities in 
Russia has significant ramifications on issues concerning energy security in the 
region.”100 Respectively, US presence in Iraq-Afghanistan combined with the role of 
NATO during G. W. Bush’s administration (as a tool for U.S geostrategic expansion 
in Eastern Europe and Caucasus region) reflects that Caspian-Black Sea and Caucasus 
                                                            
99 L. Drakopoulos, ‘Ενεργειακή πολιτική και περιφερειακή ασφάλεια στον Καύκασο και την Κεντρική 
Ευρώπη, H Ρωσία του Καυκάσου’[Energy policy and regional security in Caucasus and the Central 
Europe , Russia of Caucasus] Seira Geopolitikwn Meletwn, Impact forecasts, pp.40‐41 G. M. Windrow, 
op.cit. , pp. 85‐86   
100 G. M. Windrow, op.cit. , pp. 85‐86   
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region are the new “battlefields” between Russia and the West. The enlargement of 
NATO offers to USA the ability to consolidate its political, financial and military 
influence in those regions of major importance which are crucial for the European 
energy security and supply. According to Tassos Kokkinidis, US via NATO tries to 
achieve two main targets:  
a. To profit the American companies in order to manufacture alternative 
pipeline projects; and  
b. To assist Europe to diminish its energy dependence from 
Russia;101  
  Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning in NATO underlines the importance 
of energy security and why NATO has to develop a concrete role and strategy over 
Energy issues: 
“…sudden disruptions in supplies can have not only major economic but also 
political consequences for NATO Member States[…] the tightness in the global oil 
market and recent price increases, not to mention the threat of terrorist attacks 
against critical infrastructure, have once again made energy security an issue of 
strategic importance[…]NATO has a responsibility to discuss any subject that 
concerns Allies, and as certain Allies have an even higher dependency than others 
on imports of natural gas, it is only natural that they should wish to raise this issue 
in NATO bodies. However, it is too early to determine which roles NATO could 
and should play.”102 
                                                            
101 Available at: http://www.foreignpress‐gr.com/2008/04/blog‐post_06.html 
102 See http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue3/english/special1.html  
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Therefore, the control and exploitation of Eurasian energy sources inaugurated 
new rivalry policies and it seems that “nowadays, rockets and tanks appear to be 
replaced by pipelines and faucets in USA-Russia juxtapose”.103 
As regards the European Union, is one of the biggest global consumers and 
importers of hydrocarbons. Fossil fuels (oil, natural gas and carbon) represent 4/5 of 
EU’s total energy consumption while 2/3 of them are imported.104As for the 
geopolitical dimension, it is important to stress that 45% of imported oil derives from 
Middle East and 40% of imported natural gas (approximately 20% of European 
energy consumption) from Russia.105 During the period 1997-2004, in EU-25 the 
energy demand increased annually 0.93 per cent. Moreover, Grigoriadis stresses that, 
“According to the projections of the International Energy Agency (IEA), the 
European energy market demand in natural gas will increase on an annual rate 2.4% 
and reach 630 bcm annually in 2030.”106 
Concerning the above mentioned realities, combined with the oncoming 
lessening of North Sea natural gas fields and the extraordinary increase of energy 
prices, EU had to develop a long-term strategy towards its energy diplomacy. 
Russian-Ukrainian crisis on January 2005 over natural gas prices and Russia’s 
reaction to cut the gas amounts to Ukraine and Europe brought to the surface Europe’s 
weaknesses because of its energy policy and security. European energy dependency 
from Russia (25% of gas consumption is provided by Russian Federation), European 
needs for additional gas supplies and Ukraine’s monopoly to be the main energy 
                                                            
103 See http://www.foreignpress‐gr.com/2008/04/blog‐post_06.html 
104 ISTAME, ‘To Eνεργειακό μέλλον της Ελλάδας’[The Energy future of Greece], Keimeno Tekniriwseis 
No 4,  Athens, August 2006, pp.5  
105 Ibid. 
106 I. N. Grigoriadis, op. cited, pp.1 
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“gate” from Russia to Europe were significant indicators for EU leaders to examine 
alternative energy policies towards Russia and EU’s future energy security and 
structure. 
 The Black Sea and the Caspian Sea regions could provide alternative paths 
for European energy supplies. In 1994, the European Union has supported the Energy 
Treaty Charter which was signed and ratified by South Caucasus and Central Asia 
states. Furthermore, it is the largest donor of the region. Through TACIS program 
TRACECA was established, a Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor which is 
responsible for constructing transport infrastructures south of Russia and transform 
this area into an energy bridge.107 
 Specifically concerning the Black Sea region, John M. Roberts suggest that it 
can play a crucial role in European Energy Security for a variety of reasons: 
“Geographically, it forces attention onto how oil and gas from further afield should 
reach Europe’s major consumer markets; Politically, many Black Sea countries have 
to weigh their domestic energy security with their current or prospective role in 
ensuring broader regional or continental energy security and; Economically, they may 
be in a position to influence the terms under which oil and gas reach Europe.”108 
Eventually, Caucasus and the Black Sea regions109 inter-connection with the EU’s 
energy security interests and European market are related with two key prerequisites. 
Bosporus -oil transportation- bypass and the EU’s Gas balance to 2030. 
In terms of oil, Bosporus bypass proposals offer the EU two potential assets. First 
and foremost, the environmental dimension as the congested Turkish straits and the 
                                                            
107 F. ‐L. Altmann, John Lampe, op.cit., pp.144 
108 J. M. Roberts, ‘The Black Sea and European Energy Security’, Southeast European Studies, ELIAMEP, 
Vol.6,No. 2,Athens, June 2006, pp.207   
109 or broader Eurasia 
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ongoing increase110 of hazardous cargo transitions are like a “time bomb” in the heart 
of the large(approximately 17-20 million citizens) city of Istanbul, if even a single  
accident were to take place. Secondly, a Bosporus bypass pipeline project can 
diminish Ukraine’s monopoly as an “energy gate” over pipeline routes which connect 
Europe with Russia. EU is eager to promote at least two or more projects which will 
support its independence and strengthen its energy security. 
Adris Pielbalgs, European Union’s commissioner, responsible for energy had 
stated that Burgas - Alexandroupolis oil pipeline“[…] is going to play a very positive 
role in the region and will create an alternative route of supply for oil that comes from 
the Black Sea. It will also have a positive environmental effect since it will 
substantially reduce the very congested Bosporus Straits.”111 Thereaftrer, Burgas – 
Alexandroupolis (BA)112 oil pipeline seems to be one of the prevalent projects which 
will ensure EU’s energy strategy and pipeline diplomacy. Its low cost along with the 
fact that only three parties are directly involved and it will pass through only two of 
them (Greece-Bulgaria both EU member states) are important indicators for its 
efficiency and function as an alternative route and as a Bosporus bypass proposal.  
On April 2006, the Transneft group, responsible for the Russian part of this 
project has decided to support BA oil pipeline route.  
Nevertheless, BA project have faced criticism mainly by a number of EU and 
especially the United States because as D.Triantaphyllou stresses, it “[…] would be 
the first-ever pipeline designed to be controlled by the Russian state on EU 
                                                            
110“According to Cambridge Energy Research Associates, some 85 mt (million tons) of hazardous cargo 
transited  the  Bosporus  in  2000,98  in  2001,  117  in  2002,  144  in  2003  and…190 mt  in  or  around 
2009”Ibid., John M. Roberts,  pp.208‐209   
111 An  interview of Andris Pielbags to Vassiliki Nicoloudia, The Bridge magazine: “An Action Plan  for 
Europe” Q4/2006 ‐ Issue 3, pp.34 
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territory.”113As a matter of fact several EU key-member states such Germany, France 
and Italy, individually, have developed bilateral relations with Russia due to energy 
issue. As for the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy, Charalampos Tsardanidis& 
Stelios Stavridis signify that, “Greece’s national interests are better served via 
multilateral efforts, mainly in the EU, rather than unilateral or bilateral 
ones.”114Moreover, in 2005, Steve Marsh and Hans Mackenstein have marked that: 
“EU is far from a single entity that dictates the actions of its member states. The member 
states have hitherto ensured that the EU doesn’t have resource to all the external relations 
tools traditionally held by a state, most notably military force. Perhaps more significantly, 
EU external relations are marked by a constant battle for competencies, both between the 
member states and the different EC institutions and between the different EC institutions 
themselves.”115  
 In other words, “Europeanization” as a process can contain various policies as 
long as priorities and strategies are concerned. Greece’s pipeline diplomacy and 
support to BA, despite the fact that, it raises concerns over the EU member states 
about its Europeanized or national predispositions, does not automatically exclude 
Greece’s European prospects and Union’s interests. Not only it does it apply to 
European energy standards and needs but it also sustains the EU’s integrating process 
in the Balkans. 
In terms of natural gas, in 2002 EU published its Green Paper on Energy Security. 
According to this, “as long as European Union’s external supply of gas depends  41% 
of imports from Russia and almost 30% from Algeria, geographically diversification 
                                                            
113 D.  Triantaphyllou,  ‘Energy  Security  and Common  Foreign  and  Security Policy  (CFSP):  The Wider 
Black Sea Area Context’, Southeast European Studies, ELIAMEP, Vol.7, No.2, Athens, June 2007 pp.291   
114  C.  Tsardanidis  ‐S.  Stavridis,  ‘The  Europeanisation  of  Greek  foreign  policy:  a  critical  appraisal’, 
Southeast European Studies, The  Institute of  International Economic Relations, Vol.27, No.2,Athens, 
June 2005, pp.218     
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of our supplies would appear desirable”; and that EU’s demand in gas during the 
period 1998-2030 will increase 45% only among EU-15 members.116Eventually, EU’s 
enlargement combined with Russian-Ukrainian crisis had intensified EU concerns. 
Inevitably, EU’s (one of the largest gas consumers) proximity with Russian 
Federation (the largest gas producer and exporter) makes it reasonable for both parties 
to figure out policies that ensure their common and partial interests.   
Multiple supply natural gas sources from Caspian Basin and Central Asia along 
with European pressures to Russia to exercise more cooperative and less 
monopolistic-dominant position over common energy issues led the European 
Commission in March 2007 to adopt “an energy policy for Europe with the goal to 
combat climate change and boost the EU’s energy security and competitiveness.”117 
As a result Southeastern Europe became one of the important regions due to its 
potentiality to be   a transport hub for Europe. Greece’s geostrategic position and EU-
membership status had offered multiple advantages for Greek state to develop a 
strong presence and voice in the region. 
The Greek Ministry of Development conducted an “action plan of energy 
efficiency, according to the requirements of the EU Directive 2006/32.The 
improvement of energy output constitutes a crucial priority for the energy policy of 
the European Union and Greece. According to the EU’s energy regulations, as it 
underlined in the strategy of Lisbon, the energy policy in the EU is constituted by 
several objectives118 which are also adopted at the national level: Reduction of oil 
dependency; Increasion of natural gas consumption; Security of state’s energy supply 
                                                            
116 J. M. Roberts, op.cit., pp.215 
117 EUROPE IN FIGURES — Eurostat yearbook 2008 ,pp.435 
118 Hellenic Ministry of Development, ‘Sxedio Drasis Energeiakis Apodosis‐SDEA’[Energy Output Action 
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(by participating trans-European networks); Usage of renewal energy sources (sun, 
wind etc.); and the protection of Environment; 
  Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) Interconnector, was the first European gas pipeline 
project which marked the European Union’s attempts to diversify its energy suppliers 
and diminish European energy dependency of Russia. In addition to the above 
mentioned benefits, on a medium-term basis, TGI will have the ability to further 
increase natural gas quantities being delivered through the giant Shah Deniz II 
,Caspian’s Azeri area gas field, Iraq and Iran to European markets.  
According to the Regulatory Authority for Energy in Greece, “The importance of 
developing new transit pipelines for the diversification of the European Union’s 
natural gas supply sources, which will have direct positive effects on the level of the 
Greek market’s security of supply, also highlighted in the European Union’s Second 
Strategic Energy Review, which describes the creation of the Natural Gas South 
Corridor.”119 
In the European Union’s Second Strategic Energy Review, European Commission 
put forward a five-point Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan120: 
- Infrastructure needs and the diversification of energy supplies;  
- External energy relations; 
- Oil and gas stocks and crisis response mechanisms; 
- Energy efficiency; and 
- Making the best use of the EU's indigenous energy resources; 
This political agenda presents how Europe plans to deal with its “core energy 
objectives of  sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply, by reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions by 20%, increasing the share of renewable sources in the 
                                                            
119 See http://www.rae.gr/K2/Report‐SoS_GAS_en.pdf 
120 See http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2008/2008_11_ser2_en.htm. 
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energy consumption to 20% and improving energy efficiency by 20%, all of it by 
2020.”121 
The official statements of European Commission’s President José Manuel 
Barroso122 and Benita’s Ferrero-Waldner123, as a European Commissioner for 
External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy related to EU's second 
Strategic Energy Review package in Brussels are revealing how EU is eager to 
exercise common energy policies in order to arm European security and supply future. 
Moreover, a set of cross-border infrastructure developments were adopted in 
accordance with the European Union’s direct energy security precedence. Among 
others, the EU’s 3rd internal energy legislative package promotes: 
“Development of a Southern Gas Corridor for supply from Caspian and 
Middle Eastern sources and possibly other countries in the longer term, 
improving security of supply; Completion of a Mediterranean energy 
ring, linking Europe with the Southern Mediterranean through electricity 
and gas interconnections to improve energy security and to help develop 
the vast solar and wind energy potential; Development of North-South 
gas and electricity interconnections within Central and South-East 
                                                            
121 See http://www.europa‐eu‐un.org/articles/en/article_8300_en.htm 
122 José Manuel Barroso stated that: “Energy prices have risen by an average of 15% in the European 
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dependence on imports. We have to invest and diversify. The proposals adopted today represent an 
unequivocal statement of the Commission's desire to guarantee secure and sustainable energy 
supplies, and should help us deliver on the crucial 20‐20‐20 climate change targets.”(Available online 
at: http://www.europa‐eu‐un.org/articles/en/article_8300_en.htm) 
123Ibid.  Benita  Ferrero‐Waldner  argues  that:  “A  greater  focus  on  energy  in  the  EU's  international 
relations  is crucial to the energy security of the EU. The development of strong and reliable energy 
partnerships  with  suppliers,  transit  countries  and  other  major  energy  consumers  is  a  key,  and 
therefore  the new  generation  energy  interdependence provisions  proposed  today  is  an  important 
step  forward.   Today's  review  also  proposes  steps  to  strengthen  the  EU's  capacity  to mobilize  in 
support of essential infrastructure to bring supplies from third countries”  
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Europe, building on the Energy Community inter alia, supporting the 
national energy regulators and Transmission System Operators;”124    
    Conclusively, Greece actively participates in EU’s energy policy agenda by 
supporting important proposed projects such as: TGI’s second pipeline’s branch from 
Stavrolimenas to Otranto and the South branch of the South Stream Pipeline, which 
will connect the energy networks of Greece with the Balkans and Italy. Third party 
role in the Greek energy security environment and pipeline diplomacy affect the way 
in which energy policies and pipeline diplomacy in Southeastern Mediterranean 
region will develop. Greece, as a member state in the EU, implements energy policies 
according to broader European Union’s needs and strategies. 
As for the Republic of Turkey, by turning to its specific geopolitical 
characteristics and by following its national interests, tries to shape its national energy 
policy and pipeline diplomacy in the region. Obviously, like Greece, the geopolitical 
and geostrategic game of gas and oil pipeline projects which will transfer 
hydrocarbons from Eurasia region to Western consumers directly influence crucial 
geostrategic parameters of Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
124 See http://www.europa‐eu‐un.org/articles/en/article_8300_en.htm 
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B. The Turkish case 
1. Turkey’s energy security policy as a crossroad between Central Asia and 
Southeastern Europe 
  
The Republic of Turkey (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti) is a Eurasian country that 
stretches across the Anatolian peninsula in Minor Asia and Eastern Thrace, in the 
Balkan region of southeastern Europe. Turkey is bordered by eight countries, Bulgaria 
to the northwest; Greece to the west; Georgia to the northeast; Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Iran to the east; and Iraq and Syria to the southeast. The Mediterranean Sea and 
Cyprus are to the south; the Aegean Sea to the west, and the Black Sea to the north. 
Its total land area covers approximately 781000 k݉ଶ of which about 97% is in Asia 
and just 3% is on European soil. Turkey’s coastline (Mediterranean, Aegean and 
Black Seas) totals more than 8.333 km. The Sea of Marmara and the Turkish Straits 
(Bosporus and the Dardanelles) which separate Anatolia from East Thrace are 
commonly regarded to be the natural “border” between Asia and Europe, making 
Turkey transcontinental. 
The geostrategic position of Turkey as a critical location on the intersection of 
East and West and as a natural bridge between the Middle East and the Caucasus 
regions on the one hand and the European peninsula on the other, renders Turkey as a  
potential key - regional player in the wider Eurasian region. 
During the Cold War, the Soviet threat had forced Turkey to establish strong 
ties with the U.S.A although that policy limited Turkey’s ability to implement 
independent policies according to its national interests. On the contrary, in the 1980’s, 
General Kenan Evren’s last military coup d’état let Turkey to exercise extensive 
economic reforms. This systematic liberalization allowed further industrialization and 
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westernization of the Turkish economy and paved the way for future foreign policy 
strategies and opportunities in Turkey. “Even before the 1991 collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and the subsequent scramble to develop Caspian Sea energy resources, 
Turkey’s control of the Bosporus made it crucial to the Soviet Union’s oil exports 
from the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.”125    
 The collapse of the bipolar system in the beginning of 90’s, rapidly, altered 
the Turkish foreign policy priorities. The new era brought entirely new challenges. 
Turkish Foreign Policy, which traditionally was formulated around two main 
structural principles: (i) “The maintenance of the nation’s independence and 
achievement of security; and (ii) the preservation of the status quo and the country’s 
national, secularist and modernist regime”126, had to redefine Turkey’s regional, 
strategic and political role. Turkey’s western orientations are clearly pointed out 
through its membership in various international organizations such as: the UN;127 
(1945) NATO; (1952) OECD; (1961) OSCE; (1973) ECO; (1985) BSEC; (1992) The 
Black Sea Naval Co-Operation Task Group-BLACKSEAFOR; (1998) and the G-20 
major economies (1999).128 
The end of the Cold War was expected to signal a ‘decline phase’ in Turkey’s 
importance in NATO. The EU’s eastward expansion and its intention to establish the 
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European Army force (a Franco-German project), were perceived by Turkey, as a 
demise of its strategic role in East Mediterranean/Middle East region; since Turkey’s 
membership in the EU was, and still remains, under discussion. Soviet Union’s 
dissolution has brought to the surface an entirely “new world” close to the east 
borders of Turkey. The newly emerged states have strong cultural and historical ties 
with Turkey. 
 Geographically, Turkey is located in close proximity to 71.8% of the world’s 
proven gas and 72.7% of oil reserves, in particular those in the Middle East and the 
Caspian basin.Turkey’s historical, linguistic, racial and religious ties with Turkic-
Muslim newly emerged states in the Caucasus region offers multiple advantages for 
Turkey, in order to establish its role as a transit state, and potentially an energy “hub” 
in the region. Thus, those newly founded states in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the 
Balkans with weak and unstable socioeconomic status remained a “zone of turmoil” 
and characterized by continuous security challenges.129 Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 
1990 and the Gulf Crisis have revealed an outstanding feebleness of Turkey’s national 
security. Non-conventional weapons of mass destruction and terrorism had become a 
potential threat against the national integrity of Turkey, along with the pre-existing 
Kurdish issue (and the methods use by separatist groups such as PKK). 
During the 1990s, Turkish society at the domestic realm was facing a political 
instability and uncertainty. The suffering of Turks and Muslims in the Middle East 
and Balkans caused by the U.S.A, Armenia, Israel and Serbia raised the sympathy of 
Turkish public opinion towards these Muslim populations. Furthermore, both Turkish 
governments and international organizations (UN, NATO and EU) reluctance to stop 
                                                            
129  E.  Inbar,  ‘Israel  Strategy’, Middle  East  Review  of  International  Affairs(MERIA)  2,  Vol.  2,  No.4 
November 1998, pp.1 
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their suffering have led Turkish society to lose, partially, its confidence to Western 
values and beliefs. In the domestic field, Turkey was facing a double threat. The 
Kurdish separatism and the resurfacing of political Islam in the Turkish political life; 
which both received economical and political support by hostile neighboring countries 
of Turkey such as Syria, Iraq and Iran.  
Turgut Özal’s vision (prime minister 1989-1991) for the post-Cold War era 
was that Turkey had to exercise a new regional role in order to increase its regional 
influence in its neighborhood (Central Asia/Caucasus, Middle-East and Balkans). 
This was the idea of Yeni Osmanlıcılık “neo-Ottomanism”130which was based 
on four main pursuits. Thanos Veremis and Thanos P.Ntokos131 defined new Turkish 
foreign policy initiatives as: 
1. the restoration of the strategic importance of Turkey especially in U.S eyes, Turkey’s 
main ally by deciding the participation of Turkey in the Gulf War, a political decision 
which  was  contradicted  to  the  traditional  Turkish  neutral  stance  in  intra‐Arabic 
issues;  as  well  as  the  continuation  of  the  tight  political  and  military  ties  with 
Washington; 
 
2. the  economic  and  commercial  opportunities which  emerged  in  Central  Asia’s  and 
Caucasus new states. Turkey played a sufficient role in their full membership into the 
Economic  Cooperation Organization  and  the  Islamic  Conference Organization.  E.U 
skepticism  forced  Turkey  to  search  for  alternative  commercial  and  diplomatic 
channels; 
   
3. the  active  interference  in  regional  conflicts  like  in  the  Serbian‐Bosnian  and  the 
Armenian‐Azerbaijani cases(former territories of Ottoman Empire); and, 
4. to present Turkey as a central actor and not as a traditional peripheral player; 
 
                                                            
130 “the  idea of Neo‐Ottomanism, means  that Turkey must play multiple  roles  in  the area  formerly 
ruled by  the Ottoman Empire”   see  Idris Bal, Turkish Foreign Policy  in Post Cold War Era, Ramazan 
Gozen’s article: “Turkish Foreign Policy In Turbulence of the Post Cold War Era: Impact of External and 
Domestic Constrains ”,(Florida: Brown Walker Press, Florida ,U.S.A, 2004), pp. 46  
131  T.  Veremis  &  T.  P.Ntokos,  H  σύγχρονη  Toυρκία,  Kοινωνία,  Oικονομία,  Eξωτερική  Πολιτική 
”[Modern Turkey, Society, Economy, Foreign Policy], (Athens: Papazisis publications, ELIAMEP, Athens 
2002), pp. 510‐511 
63 
 
Özal’s attempt was to synthesize the Turkish and Islamic elements of the 
Republic of Turkey by emphasizing to modern Turkey’s nationalism and its Ottoman-
Islamic legacy.  
The following decade (1991-2002), political turmoil in Turkey (kemalists 
versus islamists), weak governmental coalitions and the Kurdish issue had raised 
questions on how Ankara perceived its relations with the EU and the USA132 and if it 
can materialize its foreign policy strategic goals “as the most prominent partner for 
the West in the Muslim world”133. 
Those set of perceptions and feelings motivated part of Turkish society 
“towards soul-searching, looking for an alternative identity for a greater and stronger 
Turkey.”134 In this respect, political Islam, nationalism and Westernization, the three 
traditional political and socio-political ideologies in Turkey were redefined and 
mainly political Islam increased its influence as a reaction to those external 
environment developments. 
 This shift was reflected in December 24th elections in 1995 when Necmettin 
Erbakan’s Islamic party, Refah Partisi (RP)135 won the majority of the votes and 
increased its votes from only 5% in 1985 to 21.4%. 
The election results revealed, as Hakan Yavuz states “a sharply divided 
society and reflected the ongoing search for new state-society relation.”136The six 
                                                            
132 All those parameters were challenging even the basic values and principles of this Western‐
oriented, secular state of East Mediterranean region. 
133 I. O. Lesser, ‘Global Trends, Regional Consequences: Wider Strategic Influences on the Black Sea’,  
International Center for Black Sea Studies‐ICBSS, Vol.5  Νο.4, November 2007,pp. 12    
134 I. Bal, op. cit., pp.40 All those parameters were challenging even the basic values and principles of 
this Western‐oriented, secular state of East Mediterranean region. 
135 In English: the Welfare Party 
136 M. H. Yavuz , ‘Turkish‐Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate’ , Journal of 
Palestine  Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, Autumn, 1997, pp.29.  See  also: Moreover  the way  some  Turkish 
Journals  reported  this  event  indicates  the  domestic  disorder,  “The  Black  Turks  versus  the White 
Turks” or “The Other Turkey Wins the elections” etc. Supra, I. Bal.  
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months delay from Erbakan’s victory to the formation of a coalition government with 
Tansu Ciller’s Dogru Yol Partisi/DYP137 on 28th June 1996 is itself an indication of 
the deep agitation within the Turkish political life. The most significant aspect of the 
new government was that for the first time, the Turkish Republic had an Islamist 
prime minister. 
This series of uncertainties for Turkey, in global, regional and local level, as 
Ramazan Gozen claims, were forced into Turkey’s foreign policy, leading into an 
interactive process between the external and internal environment138.Moreover, the 
writer stresses, “[…] the external environment influenced Turkish foreign policy 
making process not only direct by influencing Turkish decision-makers, but also 
indirect through its influence on Turkish domestic politics, which in turn influenced 
Turkey’s foreign policy-making process.”139   
Ankara was and still is eager to support the independence and economic 
development of Transcaucasian states. President Demirel’s statement is revealing on 
how Turkey perceives that region, “[…] Turks see this rich region of oil and gas 
reserves, not just a source of energy, but as an element of stability. Just as the 
founders of the European Community saw coal as a source of peace and stability for 
Europe, so we see oil and gas in our region serving the same role.”140  
Turkey’s opening to “Muslim East” was certified by Turkish participation, as 
a Muslim country, in several organizations such as: The Organization of The Islamic 
                                                            
137 In English: the True Path Party 
138 I. Bal, op. cit., pp. 28   
139 Ibid. 
140 E. Karagiannis, Energy and Security  in the Caucasus,  (London: RoutledgeCurzon, Taylor & Francis 
Group, London, 2002), pp. 92 
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Conference-OIC; (1969) TÜRKSOY141; (1993), “Developing Eight” (D-8), 
development cooperation among Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, 
Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey (1997).142 
On March 2003, Recep Tayip Erdoğan became Turkey’s prime minister by 
achieving an overwhelming victory, as the leader of AKP,143 (Adalet ve Kalkιnma 
Partisi) in 2002 Turkish elections. AKP is the successor party of Erbakan’s Islamic 
party (RP).The Turkish Prime Minister elevated Ahmet Davutoğlu as the chief foreign 
policy advisor of Erdoğan’s government. He proposed a new geo-strategy for modern 
Turkish foreign policy. According to Davutoğlu’s concept of ‘strategic depth’144 of 
modern Turkish foreign policy, “[…] Turkey, as a result of its historical legacy of the 
Ottoman Empire, possesses great geographical depth.”145Furthermore, A. Murison 
argues that, “The leadership of the AK party demonstrates a renewed zeal for 
involvement in the affairs of the Middle East, the Balkans, Caucasus and Central 
Asia, but it acts much more cautiously than the Islamist predecessor Refah 
party.”146Moreover he stated that, “[t]he Erdoğan government’s foreign policy under 
Davutoğlu’s guidance seeks ‘a zero conflict’ [with its neighbors, such as Greece, 
Syria and Armenia] foreign policy for Turkey, as well as a balance between relations 
with Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and with the United States.”147  
                                                            
141 TÜRKSOY is a Joint Administration of Turkic Culture and Art. Its member countries are Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
142 See http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?7cafe2ef‐78bd‐4d88‐b326‐3916451364f3 
143 In English: Justice and Development Party  
144  This  concept  is  eponymous with  the  title  of A.Davutoğlu’s  book,  ‘Stratejik Derinlik:  Türkiye’nin 
Uluskarasι Konumu [The Strategic Depth: The Turkish International Location]. This book published in 
Turkish in 2001.  
145  A. Murinson,  ‘  The  strategic  depth  doctrine  of  Turkish  Foreign  policy’, Middle  Eastern  Studies, 
RoutledgeCurzon , Taylor & Francis Ltd, Vol. 46, no.6, 2006, pp. 947 
146 Ibid 
147 Supra, A. Murinson,  pp.960 
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Particurlarly, Davutoğlu’s doctrine main point for the Turkish-Greek relations 
is that:“[…]The area in which Turkey is close  to  war, more than other cases, is the 
islands of Aegean [viz Greece]; which in important degree limit its [viz Turkey’s] 
strategic space, due to [Turkey’s] unforgivable errors that have been caused by the 
absence of reliable marine strategy. The bitter compensation of this accumulated 
errors was the Kardak/[Imia] crisis which brought in the surface the Greek 
sovereignty even in rocky islands near our coasts.”148 
   Inferentially, the modern Turkish “neo-Ottomanic” foreign policy based on 
Davutoğlu’s “Strategic Depth’ of Turkey can be traced to Özal’s aspirations to 
synthesize Turkism with Ottomanism and Erbagan’s Islamic ideology and his foreign 
policy to deepen Turkey’s relations with the Islamic world149. Under Davutoğlu’s 
foreign policy dogma, the Turkish energy security policy and pipeline diplomacy is 
embodied in the new “neo-Ottomanic” ideological background. Hence, it became one 
of the most important parameters through which Turkey tries to consolidate itself as a 
regional power            
However, it is important to examine how the Turkish energy market is 
composed and which are the rates of energy consumption and domestic energy 
production in the state.150  
During the period 1990-2003 total primary energy supply (TPES) increased up 
to 58% and reached 83.7Mtoe. Oil dependence declined from 51% (1973) to 38% 
(2003) and natural gas demand has grown rapidly gaining a 23% share in TPES 
                                                            
148  A.  Ampatzis,  Islam  Light  ‐  ο  πολιτικός  αναχρονισμός  στην  Τουρκία,  [Islam  Light  –  Political 
anachronism  in Turkey],  (Athens: Thallos publications, Athens, 2006), “Στρατηγικό Βάθος σελ. 122” 
[Strategic Depth, pp. 122].(Available from: http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.kosmos&id=40619)   
149 The so‐called D‐8 project was implemented during his leadership period. 
150 Information from International Treaty  Agency(IEA), Turkey’s Review 2005 , OECD, pp.24‐116  
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(2003) when in 90’s the dependence was close to zero. Import dependence became an 
important issue in Turkey. Turkey has 27.6 Mt total crude oil capacity per year. In 
2003, oil products imports were 8.1 Mt and exports 3.8Mt. 
 In the period 1990-2003, energy imports had 6% annual increase, from 51% 
to 72%.Natural gas has the biggest stake in energy imports while they increased (by 
16.3Mtoe) when oil reached 8.2Mtoe. 
As for the domestic energy production, in 2003 was 23.8Mtoe (28% of 
TPES).Oil and gas production covered both a small amount of energy production 
close to 12% while oil production was 2.5Mtoe and gas 0.5Mtoe.Turkey has relatively 
small oil reserves mostly from oil springs in the south-east and north-west of the 
country. It is expected that oil production will decline by almost half of 2003 
standards by 2010. Moreover, Turkey has small proven gas reserves with total gas 
production 0.6 bcm per annum and 8bcm remaining gas reserves. In 1997, the Kuzey 
Marmara gas field began to function.   
The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MNER) is responsible for 
energy policies in public and private sector. It has the following energy security 
policy agenda: 
I. To determine and implement national energy policy objectives; 
II. To coordinate between the dependent and related institutions and other public 
and private entities; 
III. To prepare and/or supervise programs in conformity with energy policy; 
IV. To ensure the implementation of the programs; and, 
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V. To supervise and control all exportation, development, production and 
distribution activities for energy and natural resources. 
The MENR regard energy security policy as a high priority for Turkish 
national interests for the following causes: “The limited domestic energy sources and 
the (still) limited production capacity of these resources; The growing energy 
demand; and, The high level of dependence on energy imports, primarily oil and gas; 
In terms of oil supply and refining, the Turkish Petroleum Corporation 
(TPAO), a fully stated-owned enterprise, is the largest oil producer (68.4% of the total 
oil production) and Turkse Perenco N.V the second by 25%. Approximately, twelve 
oil companies151 (two domestic, TPAO and BOTAŞ, and ten foreign) produced oil 
and petroleum products. BOTAŞ is the Petroleum Pipeline Company which is 
responsible for oil and gas transportation projects and importation. In 2003, TPAO 
owned 158 oil concessions, 110 for exploration and 48 for oil production. Along with 
Perenco N.V and Madison Oil Turkey Inc, TPAO held five oil concessions under 
international joint ventures. Moreover, TPAO participates in three different offshore 
exploration and joint ventures in the Azeri part of the Caspian Sea: the Azeri-Chirag 
Guneshli (6.75% in Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC), Shah 
Deniz (9% share) and Alov projects (10% share). Additionally, TPAO is also 
participates in oil (as well as gas) exploration and production in Kazakhstan (holds 
49% of the joint venture Kazakturkmunay-KTM with the Kazakh Ministry of 
Geology and Energy).    
                                                            
151 See also: F. Tayfur ‐K.Göymen, ‘Decision Making in Turkish Foreign Policy: The Caspian Oil Pipeline 
Issue’, Middle Easter Studies, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Ltd online publication date April 1st 2002, 
Vol. 38, No.2, pp.101‐122  
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Four refineries are exploited in Turkey, Izmit refinery (11.5 Mt per year), 
Izmir (10Mt), Kırıkkale (5Mt) and Batman (1.Mt), owned by TÜPRAŞ. TÜPRAŞ is 
the only refinery company in Turkey. Current refinery capacity can’t meet future 
petroleum products demands in Turkey while forecasts for oil consumption claim that 
by 2010 Turkey will increase up to 39.8Mt and by 2020 will exceed to 58.9Mt.      
In terms of natural gas sector, the Turkish government’s aims are: 
- To increase the use of natural gas; 
- To expand gas transmission networks; 
- To build gas distribution networks in the cities; 
- To establish a liberal and competitive natural gas market.  
- To diversify the import sources for the security of supply; and, 
- To develop transit infrastructures between the Caspian Sea and the Middle 
East and Europe. 
Until 2001, when Natural Gas Market Law (Law no: 4646) regulation was voted, 
state-owned company BOTAŞ had the monopoly in gas transmission, imports and 
exports. Six local distribution companies are active in Ankara (EGO), in Istanbul 
(İGDAŞ), in İzmit (İZGAZ), in Adapazzarı (AGDAŞ), in Bursa (BURSAGAZ) and in 
Eskiehir (ESGAZ).In 2003 about 16bcm were imported via pipelines and about 
5bcm via LNG terminal, out of total natural gas imports of 21.2bcm.  
During the period 2005-2007, oil consumption in Turkey was 35% and by 29% 
natural gas while the rest covered by coal, hydroelectric and renewable sources. 
70 
 
Turkish Energy power system was composed by the following energy products (per 
energy source)152: 
Oil and Petroleum products    
Turkey imported crude oil and petroleum products from Russia, which is 
Turkey’s top supplier, secondary Iran; Saudi Arabia and smaller amounts by Libya, 
Iraq, and Syria. In 2003, Turkey exported certain oil products (such as gasoline, fuel 
oil and diesel/gas oil) totaled 3.6Mt in the OECD markets (about 33%) and to the 
Middle-East (about 33%).  TÜPRAŞ was the main exporter while its exports from 
refined and petrochemical products were US$855 million (2003).Turkey has three 
major domestic crude oil pipelines under the authority of BOTAŞ.  
Natural Gas 
 Turkey imports almost all (indigenous gas production corresponds to 3%) its 
natural gas sources demand from Russia (via the Blue Stream gas pipeline that links 
Russia to Turkey through Black Sea),from Iran and Azerbaijan through pipelines and 
as liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies under contract with Algeria and Nigeria. 
Natural gas consumption rapidly increased in Turkey and reached 1.1 trillion cubic 
feet (tcf) in 2006 when in early the 90’s was 122.5 bcf.  
Under those circumstances it is important to examine how the current structure 
of the Turkish energy networks is functioning, and which are the present and future 
oil/gas pipeline projects. In other words, it is a given that Turkey’s foreign Policy will 
be directed into a course that will ensure the covering of its domestic demands (on 
energy). The question is, whether the pre-existing issues between Turkey and its 
                                                            
152 Available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Turkey/Full.html 
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neighboring states will pose an obstacle to that procedure; or it will signal the 
beginning of a new era, where energy will be the new diplomatic, problem-solving 
path to foreign policy concerns.  
2. Energy networks, present and future oil/gas pipeline projects153 in Turkey 
PETROLEUM 
 
Iraq-Turkey (or Kirkuk- Yumurtalık) two parallel crude oil pipelines: built in 1974 
and 1987, they have 71 million tons of oil transport capacity per year, 966 km long 
and they delivered Iraqi oil from Kirkuk-Musul- Ninawa province154 to the Ceyhan- 
Yumurtalık (Turkey’s main oil terminal) marine terminal on the southeastern 
Mediterranean coasts of Turkey.155 Those pipelines suffered by Gulf crisis (1990-
1991) and the Iraq war in 2003 and that’s why they don’t function properly (although 
technically they are available for transportation).156   
Baku (Azerbaijan)-Tbilisi (Georgia)-Ceyhan (Turkey) or BTC crude oil pipeline: it 
supplies Turkey with oil from the Azeri- Chirag - Guneshli oil field in the Caspian 
Sea, via Georgia’s capital to the Mediterranean Sea’s Turkish port of Ceyhan. It has 
1.760km extent and its capacity it’s rated to be one million bpd (50Mt per year). Its 
cost was almost $ 4 billion and has a lifespan of 40 years.157 From the Black Sea port 
of Samsun Samsun- Ceyhan (or Trans-Anatolian Pipeline) oil pipeline it will transfer 
                                                            
 
153 See APPENDIX IV, Index II 
154  They  run  through  politically  sensitive  provinces  of  Kirkuk which  are  contested  areas  for  Kurds, 
Arabs  and  Turkmens. By  referendum  it will be determine  if  Kirkuk  region will be  included  in  Iraqi 
Kurdistan. Moreover  they pass across Kurdish majority areas under Turkish authority  that’s why  is 
often became an object of attacks and they don’t function properly. 
155 F. –L. Altmann, John Lampe, op. cit., pp.203 
156 B. Akçapar, Turkey's New European Era Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership,  (Lanham, 
Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc, 2007),  pp. 46 
157 International Treaty Agency (IEA), op.cit., pp.78 
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Russian and Kazakhstani oil, about 50mt capacity to Ceyhan and extra 5 mt to the 
refinery at Kirikale (near Ankara). The length would be 770 km and its cost is 
expected to be close to $2 billion. The project started on September 26th 2005 when 
the Italian company ENI and the Turkish Calik Enerji (each 50% participating 
interest) signed “a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at jointly evaluating the 
technical and economical feasibility of the Project.”158It considers being an alternative 
Bosporus bypass project and an attempt to ease the traffic burden of the Turkish 
Straits (Istanbul and Cannakale). The BTC has been implemented in three countries 
with a total of US $25 million committed for Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. BTC is 
operational since 2006           
  
NATURAL GAS 
LNG terminal in Marmara Ereğlisi operates since 1994 under the authority of state-
owned BOTAŞ. The LNG deliveries are imported through Algeria (4 bcm per year or 
3.68Mtpa) and Nigeria (1.2 bcm per year or 0.89Mtpa). Spot cargoes from Qatar and 
Australia are also delivered at the Marmara Ereğlisi terminal. This project cost 
approximately US$ 364 million.159 
LNG terminal in Aliağa (İzmir) completed since 2002 but still (2006) doesn’t 
operates. EGEGAZ LNG has the ownership of the terminal, which has send-out 
capacity 6bcm per year. This project cost almost US$ 600 million.160 
 
                                                            
158 See http://www.iea.org/Textbase/work/2006/energy_security/Cavanna.pdf 
159 See http://www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/LNG_in_Europe.pdf pp. 26 
160 IEA, Turkey’s Review 2005, op.cit. 
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Iran-Turkey gas pipeline from the Iranian city Tabriz to Turkey’s capital Ankara 
through Erzurum: It’s a 2.577 km with 30mcm daily capacity. The construction 
started in 1996 and completed in 2001. BOTAŞ spent US$600 million for the Turkish 
section. In 2007 became a target of PKK operation161 and several times suffered from 
reduction in gas supplies.162As a consequence this pipeline doesn’t function properly.  
Blue Stream undersea gas pipeline: which transfer Russian gas supplies to Turkey. It 
has 1.213 km length; with annual capacity 16bcm.It consisted by three parts. The first 
section is a 222 mile from Izobilnoye to Dzhugba (Black Sea port in Russia), then 
from Dzhugba a 235 mile undersea pipeline connects (across the Black Sea) Russian 
onshore network with the Turkish coastal area in Samsun and a further 300 mile 
pipeline links Samsun with Ankara. In 1998, Russian-Turkish agreement (between 
Gazexport and BOTAŞ) over natural gas resulted to the construction of Blue Stream 
pipeline project. Blue Stream Pipeline Company, a co-operation between ENI (Italian) 
and Gazprom (Russian) operated for the realization of the project. The construction 
completed in October 2002 and formally inaugurated in 2005. It cost U.S $3.6 
billion.163 
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) or Shah-Deniz Pipeline: is a natural gas pipeline which 
transfers Azeri gas from Caspian Sea Shah-Deniz, one of the world’s largest 
producing gas field, through Georgia to Turkish Erzurum city. It follows the route of 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) crude oil pipeline through Azerbaijan and Georgia to 
Turkey, where it is linked to the Turkish gas distribution system. The length of this 
pipeline is 691km, with 443km in Azerbaijan and 250km in Georgia.164 With initial 
                                                            
161 See http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKL1029395120070910 
162 See http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKL2728346220080127 
163 See http://www.offshore‐technology.com/projects/blue_stream/ 
164 See http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9006670&contentId=7015095 
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capacity 8.8bcm, it is expected to expand to 20bcm per year after 2012. BP (technical 
operator)  and Statoil (commercial operator) lead the pipeline consortium which has 
composed by a variety of countries. It cost $900 million165 and began to flow on 
December 2006. 
Nabucco gas pipeline project: was planned to provide Europe with additional non-
Russia (Kazakh, Turkmen, Iraqi and Egyptian) natural gas supplies. This pipeline 
proposal is competitive to Russian South Stream gas pipeline project. Nabucco will 
transport natural gas from Turkmenistan - via Caspian Sea - in Azerbaijan and via 
Georgia in Turkish city of Erzurum. From the Turkish city of Erzurum as its starting 
point, the pipeline was projected to cross Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary 
and then ends up to Baumgartner in Austria. In June 2004, the Nabucco Gas Pipeline 
International company established in Vienna. Project shareholders include Austria's 
OMV, Hungary's MOL, Romania's Transgaz, Bulgaria's Bulgargaz, and Turkey's 
Botas166. Except the countries through which Nabucco it is planned to pass, in 
February 2008, the German RWE became the sixth partner of this joint venture. Its 
planned length is 2.050km with potential annual capacity 30bcm and total cost almost 
$6 billion.167. It considers being operational in 2015.  
Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) Interconnector natural gas pipeline168    
 
 
                                                            
165 http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntr63308.htm 
166 Available at : http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/finance/11228409.asp?scr=1 
167 I. N. Grigoriadis, op. cit., pp.2 
168 See Chapter B.2. , Energy networks, present and future oil/gas pipeline in Greece.  
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3. Third party (EU-USA-Russia) role in Turkey’s energy security policy-
pipeline diplomacy  
a. The key role of Turkey in the US energy diplomacy and the European 
energy security. 
During the Cold War, the US and European policies towards Turkey were based 
on the common philosophy of containment that Turkey should exercise in order to 
counter the Russian military expansion. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
this strategic partnership with the Western alliance has begun to corrode. However, 
Turkey still is a strategic ally in U.S and EU eyes, for different reasons. 
F. Stephen Larabee suggests that: “Today Turkey remains important to the United 
States as it is a nexus of three areas of increasing strategic importance to Washington: 
the Middle East, the Caspian region, and the Balkans[…]Turkey’s cooperation is 
critical to the achievement of broader U.S objectives. Hence the United States has 
been concerned to keep Turkey firmly anchored to the West and has supported 
Turkey’s aspirations for membership in EU.”169 
Nevertheless, the Turkish-American relations passed through serious periods of 
escalation (1989-2007) on account of U.S invasion/military intervention in Iraq and 
the subsequent strengthen of Kurdish element in Northern Iraq. Kurdish issue, the last 
three decades, remains the number one internal security subject in Turkish domestic 
and foreign policy agenda. The developments occurred in Iraqi Kurdistan after Gulf 
War (1990-1991) and the subsequent tensions between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds 
concerning the fate of the Kirkuk and Mosul oil fields prevented Ankara from 
                                                            
169 D. Keridis & C. M.Perry, ‘Greek‐Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization’, IFPA‐KOKKALIS series 
on Southeast European Policy, Vol.1, 2001, pp.226 
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supporting Washington’s strategic policy in Iraq.170 Even though U.S presence in Iraq 
and Afghanistan caused uneasiness in Ankara, in contrast American energy security 
diplomacy in Black Sea-Caspian-Caucasus regions strongly favored Turkish energy 
policy interests. Zeyno Baran and Robert A.Smith in their article tried to analyze 
which are the main three elements of American Energy policy towards the Black Sea 
Region (and broader Eurasia): “By encouraging the safe and reliable transit of energy 
supplies unhindered by chokepoints or monopolies; By promoting stability and 
security (including resolution of the region’s frozen conflicts; and, by fostering 
political and economic reforms (rule of law, transparency, democratic elections, 
etc.171  
The American energy strategy aims to “elevate” the Black Sea region as the heart 
of the East-West energy corridor and transform this area into “a conduit of energy 
diversification, security and freedom between Europe and Middle East and Central 
Asia.”172 
Washington perceives Turkey as an important factor of stability and cooperation 
in the Black Sea-Caspian and broader Eurasia, because as Bülent Aras underlines 
“[…] a strong Turkey represents a positive, secular model for the newly independent 
Turkic Republics of the region which are always being courted by fundamentalist 
Iran”173 and Russia. Especially Turkey’s historical ties with its neighboring country 
Azerbaijan offers Turkey extra opportunities as to be a transit country through which 
                                                            
170  In March 2003,  the Turkish National Assembly prohibited U.S  forces  from using Turkish  territory 
and airspace  to  invade  in  Iraq. Only after  six months of negotiations among U.S‐Turkey,  the  latter 
allowed American forces to use Incirlik base for provisioning with supplies. 
171 Z. Baran and R. A. Smith, ‘The Energy Dimension in American Policy towards the Black Sea Region’, 
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Ltd, Vol. 7, No.2, June 2007,  
pp.266 
172 Ibid 
173  B.  Aras,  The  New  Geopolitics  of  Eurasia  and  Turkey’s  position,(London:  Frank  Cass  Publishers, 
London, 2002), pp.21 
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Azeri oil and gas will flow to the European markets. A sufficient indicator for US 
energy diplomacy initiatives was that it has strongly advocated for the selection and 
construction of the BTC oil pipeline (despite that this route was more costly than 
other alternative pipeline projects) and the BTE gas pipeline which they completed in 
2006. Both projects relied on American energy strategy aspirations due to their 
exceptionality/uniqueness to transfer non-Russian energy supplies exports to 
European energy consumers neither were under the control, direct or indirect, of 
Russia. 
U.S Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Special Advisor to the President and 
Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, expressing U.S support to 
the projects he argued that, “building Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and trans-Caspian 
pipeline (TCGP) makes absolute sense for both national security and commercial 
reasons […] Both pipelines will increase energy security by avoiding the 
concentration of a vast new source of oil and gas in the Persian Gulf region. Finally, 
both pipelines enjoy great potential to become lucrative investment opportunities for 
U.S. companies.”174 Moreover, at the first oil ceremony, US President G.W.Bush in a 
letter reading by US Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman referred to BTC pipeline 
construction as a “monumental achievement”, adding also that “[…] the United States 
has consistently supported [BTC oil pipeline project] because we believe in the 
project’s ability to bolster energy security, strengthen participating countries energy 
diversity, enhance cooperation and expand international investment opportunities.”175  
                                                            
174 T. Sabalı, ‘Implications of the Baku‐Tbilisi‐Ceyhan main oil pipeline project’, Perceptions, Journal of 
International  Affairs, Vol.6, No 4, Winter 2005, pp.39 
175 Ibid., pp.56 
78 
 
Obviously, those pipelines promoted Turkey’s vital need for energy imports as 
long as reduced, generally, Caspian region’s states and specifically, Georgia’s and 
Azerbaijan’s dependency on Russia. Moscow by using energy as a foreign policy 
instrument had been able to put pressure on those two newly emerged Caucasus states 
and swayed their domestic and foreign policies. 
BTC and BTE projects managed to break the Russian monopoly over oil and gas 
export pipelines in the area and allowed Europe to diversify its energy supplying 
routes. Although, both projects didn’t have as a terminal destination EU’s member 
states and mostly served the US and regional needs, the EU supported them while the 
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development financed for the implementation 
and construction of the projects.  
As a matter of fact, the European governments were more skeptical and cautious 
over Turkey’s ambitions in the Eurasia. The European perspectives on Turkey did not 
fall into line with the US energy security and regional policies.  
The end of the Cold War has heightened EU’s problems in its relationship with 
Turkey. Europe was concerned mostly with its internal construction176 and the 
Turkish-European relations were dominated mainly by economic and social issues. 
European Union put emphasis on Turkey’s human rights record; it criticized Turkey’s 
actions in Kurdish issue and expressed less enthusiasm than U.S about Turkish-Israeli 
defense and bilateral cooperation. Generally, Europeans tended to express a more pro-
Arab position in the Arab-Israeli controversy. Furthermore, many Europeans 
approached EU-Turkish relations through the prism of civilization, democracy and 
westernization of Turkey and had doubts about Turkey’s position and role in Europe. 
                                                            
176 EU’s enlargement, its economic and monetary union‐EMU and its common currency‐euro. 
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This aspect in Turkish-European relations was reflected in a former EU’s official 
statement: “Turkey has never been fully considered a European country, but neither is 
it considered fully Asian. It is at the crossroads between two cultures.”177   
 Accession talks between EU-Turkey for energy sector are still limited even 
though in 1995 customs union agreement with the EU was signed and EU law 
requires all member–states to open their pipelines for foreign 
companies.178Additionally, although, on October 2005, the accession negotiations179 
for full membership in EU began; Turkey still didn’t sign the Energy Community 
Treaty (in force since June 2004 in Athens by the EU and nine Southeast European 
states) which “aimed at creating an integrated energy market in potential accession 
states on the basis of the acquis.180 Turkey has so far refuses to ratify EECT and 
participates as an observer. 
As a consequence of 2006 natural gas crisis, EU’s perceptions on Turkish role in 
European energy security structure were shifted and converged more with American 
energy strategies in Eurasia. Eventually, the Ukrainian-Russian crisis in January 2006 
has disordered long-standing Russian-European energy relations and set off two 
                                                            
177 D. Keridis, Charles M.Perry, op.cit., pp.229  
178 K. Barysch,  ‘Turkey’s  role  in  European  energy  security’, Center of European Reform 2007, pp.6. 
(Available online from: essays/www.cer.org.uk, December 2007)  
179 Concisely, Turkey’s  relations with European Economic Community  (EEC)  ‐ predecessor of  the EU 
dated back since 1959 when Turkey first applied for associated membership. Since Helsinki Summit in 
1999  and  nearly  for  two  decades  Greece  were  blocking  Turkey’s  Europeanization  process  while 
Turkey appeared to exercise  irredentist policy towards Aegean Sea. Greece stance shifted regarding 
EU‐Turkish  relations  and  allowed  Turkey  to  start  its membership  negotiations. Turkish  candidacy 
though implicates several differentiations, challenges and obstacles: 
Since beginning of accession negotiations only 10 chapters have opened. The progress in the opening 
of  the  rest  chapters  during  2008  was  slow  but  constant.  In  total,  four more  chapters,  two  per 
presidency: Ch.4, Ch.6, Ch.7 and Ch.10.Problems still occur among others in Foreign relations, Justice, 
Education‐Culture and Energy Chapters. The Republic of Cyprus has made  it  clear  that  it will  keep 
blocking the Energy Chapter (Ch.15) due to Ankara’s provocative behavior against Cyprus to exploit its 
natural resources wealth within its Exclusive Economic Area. (Available from: http://tovima.dolnet .gr 
/kosmos.asp 
180 See http://www.energy‐community.org/ 
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interlinked realities: the European energy dependence on Russian energy resources 
(mainly gas) and Turkey’s potentiality to render as an energy hub for non-Russian 
energy resources and export routes which will provision the European market with the 
appropriate amounts of energy sources. 
Katinka Barysch stresses that, “Turkey is a big, fast-growing and stategically 
based placed country which[…] could help the ‘ageing, sclerotic EU market’ and 
generally EU to bring stability to the Middle East, the Caspian and the Caucasus; and 
it could add to the EU’s energy security by acting as a bridge to the resource-rich 
regions its neighborhood.”181Turkey fulfills those prerequisites as it possesses 
Bosporus straits and several pipeline systems that already pass through its territory 
from Russia, Caucasus and Middle East. 
The EU’s revised policy over energy relations with Turkey proved by the open 
support of EU along with US on the Turkey-Greece-Italy pipeline (TGI).The process 
of reconciliation between Greece and Turkey from 1999 allowed EU182 and USA to 
encourage both countries to connect their gas pipeline systems and as a result offered 
a new path to European consumers to purchase Caspian gas.  
On January 2004, European Commission Vice President Loyola de Palacio stated 
that the Commission was satisfied with the outcome of Turkish-Greek 
‘rapprochement’ agreements, adding also that Turkey-Greece gas pipeline: “will not 
only bolster peace and stability in the region, but will also make it possible to supply 
new gas resources from the Caspian Basin and Iran to the internal gas market of the 
enlarged European Union, and to the Balkans, thus improving security for all 
                                                            
181 K. Barysch, op.cit., pp.1 
182  Greece,  Turkey  and  the  EU  reached  a  preliminary  agreement  on  a  gas  interconnection  in  the 
summer of 1999. 
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stakeholders concerned by this infrastructures.”183Moreover, TGI is the first pipeline 
project which for the first time allows the delivery of Caspian gas to a European 
Union’s member state (Greece and at the second stage Italy) without crossing Russian 
territory or passing through Ukraine which until recently was the main energy gate for 
energy supplies to Europe. 
Turkey-Greece Interconnector was a first but small step in EU’s energy security 
process to diversify its natural gas imports and a sufficient step in Turkish-Greek 
reconciliation process. However, Nabucco gas pipeline project of the Southern 
Corridor is the most ambitious one that could make the difference by offering to the 
EU a crucial alternative path for delivering Middle Eastern and Caspian gas to 
Europe. The European Union elevated Nabucco as “EU’s most important gas supply 
project”184 because it will multiply the European energy security and will underline 
EU’s emerging energy policy to limit its dependency from Russia. Furthermore, the 
realization of Nabucco, it is an imperative key ingredient which will further 
strengthen Turkey’s ambition to be an energy “hub” between East and West. 
According to Katinka Barysch, Nabucco gas pipeline could be “a priceless 
opportunity for the EU and Turkey to prove that co-operation and integration are good 
for both sides.”185  
The Nabucco project consist a key Black Sea region gas pipeline project in the 
American pipeline diplomacy. The U.S.A had lent strong support for this project and 
along with Europe they are eager to complete the construction of the gas pipeline. 
                                                            
183 J. M. Roberts, The Black Sea and European Energy Security, op.cit., pp. 216 
184 Z. Baran and Robert A. Smith, op.cit., pp.268 
185 K. Barysch, op.cit., pp.4 
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However, this “mega project” has been troubled by several obstacles, like for 
instance, lack of additional amounts of supplies (from the exporting countries), its 
high cost, the deterioration of US-Iranian relations, Russian objections and Turkish 
demands to connect Nabucco with Turkish-European  negotiating process in the 
EU.186 
None the less, the EU-USA’s double support to the Turkish strategic role in 
energy “opens” a unique window to Turkey in order to render itself as Europe’s fourth 
main artery187 and a regional power in the Eurasia. T.G.Tsakiris, boldly, raises the 
issue for Turkey’s energy dilemma: “Turkey, partly drawn by chimeras of its Ottoman 
past, and partly motivated by an American need to consolidate the economic 
independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan, never accepted Russia’s attempt to re-
establish itself as the uncontested hegemonic power in the region.”188 
  
 In spite of Western policies, though, over Turkish energy role, Turkey cannot 
neglect the position of Russia in the wider Black Sea region’s energy chessboard” and 
how Russia perceives its strategic energy position as a key energy producer and 
transit state.   
b. The Turkish-Russian energy security policy relations 
Historically, the Turkish-Russian relations were competitive and more often than 
not, conflicting. Both countries, successors of former Empires were rivals over the 
                                                            
186 I. N. Grigoriadis, op. cited, pp.2 
187J.  M.  Roberts  in  his  paper,  ‘The  Turkish  Gate:  Energy  Transit  and  Security  Issues’,  EU‐Turkey 
Working  Paper  No.  11,  October  2004,  presents  Hakki  Akil’s  (then  deputy  director  general  of  the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry and currently Turkey’s Ambassador to Turkmenistan) statement: “Turkey  in 
the near  future constitute  the  fourth artery of Europe’s energy supply security after Russia, Algeria 
and Norway”, in an interview he had with the author on May 2004 in Istanbul. 
188 T. G. Tsakiris, ‘The Greek odyssey’, The Bridge magazine, A quarterly review on the Greek presence 
in S.E Europe and S.E Mediterranean, Q4/2006 ‐ Issue 3, pp.55‐56   
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Black Sea and the Bosporus passageways to the Mediterranean Sea which were 
battlegrounds for ages.  Tun Aybak indicates that due to the Cold War 
circumstances, “Turkish-Russian relationships were mainly determined by East-West 
ideological competition and military blocs.”189Until the late ‘90’s, each party 
expressed its mistrust to the other by supporting the separatist movements (Chechen-
Kurds) in Russia and Turkey respectively and Russian-Turkish relations were formed 
by geopolitical rivalry for the influence in the former Soviet republics. 
After the rise of Gorbachev in the Russian Federation, the relations between 
Ankara and Moscow has been transformed from antagonistic to a flourishing 
friendship based on strong economic ties190 and regular exchanges of high-level 
official deputations. The cornerstone of the begging of a new era in Russian-Turkish 
relation was the March 1991 Friendship Agreement. In May 1992, the Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin stated for the visit of Turkish Prime Minister, Suleyman 
Demirel, in Moscow that: “Turkey and Russia could now regard each other as friendly 
states and we are proceeding toward full-blooded dialogue and co-operation in all 
bases spheres of existence.”191  
The above mentioned realities prepared the ground for the most significant issue 
in Russian-Turkish relations. In December 1997, the Russian Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin visited Ankara and signed with Turkey the Agreement of gas pipeline 
Blue Stream project (a $3.2 billion agreement). In addition, the same year Turkey 
signed a 25-year agreement with Russian gas company, Gazprom under which it will 
                                                            
189 T. Aybak, Politics of the Black Sea, Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict, (London‐New York:  I.B. 
Tauris Publishers, London‐New York, 2001), pp.46  
190  In 1997,  the  volume of  trade have  reached  around $10 billion  and  a number of major  Turkish 
construction companies (Tefken, ENKA AND GAMA) had an important position in Russian construction 
sector in which they invested over $8.5 billion.  
191 E. Karagiannis, op.cit., pp.130 
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import natural gas to Turkey. Russia then became Turkey’s most important energy 
partner.192 The deepening of Russo-Turkish relations was confirmed by the 
ratification of the Eurasia Action Plan in 2001 between the former (contemporary at 
the time) foreign ministers, Ismail Çem and Igor Ivanov. The plan regards to S. 
Kiniklioğlu and V. Morkva, “called for increased dialogue on soft areas such as trade, 
culture and tourism, but also advocated regular political consultations. Since then, 
Turkey and Russia have expanded their cooperation in the fields of energy, trade, 
tourism and defense.”193    
The energy dimension is the factor that will determinate the course of their 
bilateral relations. On October 2002, the construction of the Blue Stream gas pipeline 
was completed and Russian natural gas started to flow (February 2003) from Russia 
to Turkish port of Samsun. This project was the epitome of Russian-Turkish energy 
cooperation in 21st century. Furthermore, the Russian-Turkish concerns and 
objections over US decision to commit a war in Iraq strengthen their affiliating 
process. 
Despite that, the US disapproval of the deepening of the Turkish-Russian relations 
and the American attempts to encourage Turkey to utilize its strategic geographical 
position and become a transit state center for natural gas from Eurasia to Europe, 
worsen the bilateral relations according to energy issues. The Turkish ambitions to 
render as an energy hub were in clear contradiction with the Russian hegemonic-
regional energy aspirations.  
                                                            
192  Turkey  imported  65  per  cent  of  its  natural  gas  and  20  per  cent  of  its  oil  from  Russia  (Figures 
according to Turkey’s Petroleum Corporation‐BOTAŞ)  
193 S. Kiniklioğlu and V. Morkva,  ‘An Anatomy of Turkish‐Russian Relations’, Southeast European and 
Black Sea Studies, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Ltd, Vol. 7, No 4, December 2007, pp. 535   
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The gas crisis between Ukraine and Russia in 2005 offered an alternative 
argument to the Turkish decision-makers who expressed a more sympathetic stance 
towards the USA’s energy tactics. They argued that, it is in Turkey’s interests to 
diversify its imports mainly for gas supplies and transit non-Russia energy. The 
BTC/BTE and the Turkey-Greece Interconnector projects revealed that Turkey, 
openly started to promote Western-US energy plans, a fact that fiercely opposed by 
Russia. The realization of those projects signified that Turkish pipeline diplomacy fall 
into line with the US-EU’s energy strategies. Furthermore, they had underlined two 
thorny issues between Russia and Turkey: 
- “The competition for  control over oil and gas exports from Azerbaijan; and 
- The controversy over  Turkish policies about the regulations relating to tanker 
traffic in Bosporus, Marmara Sea and Dardanelles Straits.”194 
On May 1994, the Turkish government passed revision and reform in regulations, 
in order to monitor commercial transit of the Straits.195 Even though Turkey sustained 
its policy mainly to Turkish environmental-security concerns196 over the increasing 
rates of hazardous tanker passages through the Straits, Emmanuel Karagiannis pointed 
out that, “Ankara’s motive lies elsewhere […] Turkey is engaged in an intense 
competition with Russia for the control of the route that will carry [mainly oil] from 
                                                            
194 The 1936 Montreux Treaty has been given responsibility to Turkey to allow free shipping through 
the Straits. “The Convention agreed to consists of 29 Articles, four annexes and one protocol. Articles 
2 ‐ 7 consider the passage of merchant ships. Articles 8 ‐ 22 consider the passage of war vessels. The 
key principle of  freedom of passage and navigation  is  stated  in articles 1 and 2 of  the Convention. 
Article 1 provides that "The High Contracting Parties recognize and affirm the principle of freedom of 
passage and navigation by  sea  in  the Straits";and Article 2  states  that "In  time of peace, merchant 
vessels shall enjoy complete  freedom of passage and navigation  in the Straits, by day and by night, 
under any  flag with any kind of cargo;”(Available  from: http://knowledgerush.com/kr /encyclopedia 
/Montreux_Convention_Regarding_the_Regime_of_the_Turkish_Straits/Treaty_text/) 
195 Among other regulations, Turkey: limited ship length to 190 feet; restricted vessels carrying 
hazardous materials to single passage at a time; required daylight passage of all ships over 200 
meters; and required passage only in favorable weather. 
196See:http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume6/March‐May2001/inan06.PDF, see APPENDIX V   
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Azerbaijan to the West, it is Ankara’s interest to limit Russia’s ability to export oil via 
the Straits and thus undermine the Russian-controlled Baku-Novorossiysk oil 
route.”197Russia had perceived Turkey’s new regulations as a clear threat for Moscow 
and a unilateral violation (from Turkey’s side) of the Montreux convention. The 
Russian-Turkish rivalry for political and economic influence in Eurasia is more than 
lucid in an interview with Nezavisimaia gazeta. Aleksei Arbatov, director of the 
Moscow-based Centre for Geopolitical and Military Prognoses and a then Duma 
deputy from the Yabloko party stated: “it is perfectly clear that Turkey-despite our 
lively shuttle trade- on geopolitical level represents, if not an opponent, the Russia’s 
major regional rival.”198   
The last five years the competition over oil and gas transportation is more than 
evident in the Turkish-Russian relations. Nevertheless, Turkey’s proximity with 
Russia and the subsequent Turkish dependency from Russia due to gas and oil energy 
supplies limits Turkey’s capacity to render as a regional power and a potential energy 
hub.  
Turkey’s Prime Minister Tayip Erdoğan’s statement is revealing: “The Caucasus 
Cooperation Pact is important. The United States is our ally. But Russia is our 
strategic neighbor. We buy two-thirds of the energy we need from Russia. That 
country is Turkey’s number one partner in trade […] No one must expect us to ignore 
all that. Our allies must adopt an understanding approach.”199    
                                                            
197 E. Karagiannis, op.cit., pp.133 
198 Ibid, pp.134 
199 Hürriyet newspaper: Interview with Erdoğan, September 6, 2008, accessed at ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
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Part IV: Cooperation or Antagonism between the two countries’ 
energy security policies-pipeline diplomacy? 
a. Turkey-Greece Interconnector gas pipeline project 
 
During the “peak” of Greek-Turkish “rapprochement” process in 2002, the 
Greek DEPA and the Turkish BOTAŞ energy companies signed in Ankara a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) according to which natural gas supplies 
would transfer from the Caspian Basin, through Turkey and Greece, to Europe. On 
February 23rd, 2003 in Thessaloniki Greece and Turkey signed an “Agreement on the 
realization of the Turkey-Greece gas interconnection and the supply of natural gas 
from the Republic of Turkey to the Hellenic Republic.”200 A year later in Ankara 
(December 23rd 2003), Ministers A. Tsohatzopoulos and H.Guler, signed DEPA-
BOTAŞ relative commercial agreements for the construction of the natural gas 
pipeline. 
On November 18th 2007, in Kippi-Ipsala Greek-Turkish borders, Greece and 
Turkey made the inauguration of the first leg of the TGI Interconnector gas pipeline. 
The Prime Ministers, Kostas Karamanlis and Recep Tayip Erdoğan participated in the 
ceremony.  
Julian Lee considers TGI pipeline’s significance as “fundamentally political”, 
adding also that, “it is a tangible symbol of cooperation between Greece and Turkey 
                                                            
200 See http://old.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/bilateral.html 
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on an economic level but it's also the first step in opening up a southern gas route to 
Europe from the Caspian.”201 
U.S representative Samuel Bodman (US Energy Secretary) welcomed the new 
line by saying:  
“[… ] The pipeline is a significant development, one that builds a critical 
new energy bridge between the East and West… Building this pipeline also 
required regional consensus, complex environmental analyses, and a lengthy 
and productive dialogue with all of the communities along the entire route 
[…] I also want to pay special tribute to the Turkish and Greek people for 
the cooperation they have shown on this project.  This pipeline is a success 
for the people of both countries as well as for Azerbaijan.”202 
 As a matter of fact, the realization of the Turkey-Greece Interconnector gas 
pipeline has marked the US-EU efforts to exploit Azeri energy deposits and was the 
first step of the EU’s strategic-geopolitical plan to establish the South Energy 
Corridor203. The reason why we focus our concentration mainly, on how the USA had 
                                                            
201 See  http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/nte64944.htm 
202 See http://www.energy.gov/news/5741.htm 
203 The South Energy Corridor will be constructed in the following stages: 
‐ “Phase A: exploration of oil deposits at Shah Deniz in Ajerbaijan, construction of an offshore 
oil rig and a terminal for reception/liquefaction in Sanghasal (42 km south of Baku); 
‐ Construction  of  the  970  km‐long  Baku‐Tbilisi‐Erzerum  natural  gas  pipeline  (442  km  in 
Azerbaijan, 248  in Georgia and 280  in Turkey). The pipeline  is  called  SCP  (South Caucasus 
Pipeline),  its  estimated  budget  is  1  billion  dollars,  and  it  is  considered  of  the  highest 
geopolitical importance (for the EU and US). Its maximum annual capacity is 30 billion m3; 
‐  Linkage with the Turkish pipeline system (in Turkish territory) up to Karacabey; 
‐ Construction  of  ground  and  underwater  pipeline  from  Karacabey  to  the  Greek‐Turkish 
borders and from there to Komotini, where it will be connected to Greece’s central network 
of natural gas pipelines; 
‐ Construction of the Thessaloniki‐Stavrolimenas pipeline in Western Greece; 
‐ Construction  submerging  of  underwater  TGI  Interconnector  pipeline,  starting  from 
Stavrolimenas in Greece to reach the port of Otranto in Italy with the appropriate reception 
infrastructure; and  
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considered TGI project is because traditionally they have been the most important 
third actor in the Greek-Turkish relations. As long as the Turkish incorporation into 
the EU remains volatile, the role of the United States in the Turkish-US-Greek 
“triangle” is catalytic204. Any improvement in the Greek-Turkish relations is 
welcomed by the U.S.A and in the framework of NATO, as S.V. Papacosma argued, 
“the augmented emphasis placed on the Mediterranean stability necessitated, more 
than ever, a cohesive southeastern flank free from the Greek-Turkish impasse.”205      
The Greco-Turkish rapid reconciliation process since 1999, offered the initial 
framework for the construction of the first natural gas pipeline, which delivers non-
Russian energy supplies to European market. Both countries have gained profits and 
advantages from the TGI project while it has upgraded their geopolitical and strategic 
role in the European Energy Security. Furthermore, it sustains each country’s energy 
strategy to render as an energy hub between East and West and their crucial need of 
diversification of their suppliers.  
 Eventually, we can assume that the TGI gas pipeline might be one of the most 
important bilateral cooperating processes in the history of Greek-Turkish relations; 
Although, it is early enough to declare that Greece and Turkey, through the TGI 
project, have established strong ties according to energy issues yet.  
It is remarkable though that Greece and Turkey ratified their cooperation in 
energy-pipeline sector during a period (2004-2007) in which the bilateral relations 
                                                                                                                                                                          
‐ Construction  of  the  pipelines  branch‐lines  on  Greek  territory,  with  a  view  to  potentially 
supplying  neighbouring Western  Balkans  countries,  i.e.,  FYROM,  Albania,  Serbia,  Croatia, 
Slovenia and Bosnia‐Herzegovina;” 
(Available from: http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en‐US/Economic+Diplomacy/Energy+Affairs/) 
204 K. Ifantis, op. cited, pp. 386‐387    
205 S.V. Papacosma, NATO, Greece, and the Balkans in the post‐Cold War era, in Greece and the New 
Balkans:  Challenges  and  Opportunities,  (eds.)  V.  Coufoudakis,  H.J.  Psomiades  &  A.  Gerolymatos, 
(Pella, New York, 1999), pp.61‐62 
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were far from being stable. It appears that third party role in energy security policy 
and pipeline diplomacy in both counties (US and EU specifically to the 
conceptualization and completion of TGI gas pipeline project) seems to prevail and 
weigh more, in comparison with the way interstate factors in Turkey and Greece 
perceive the nature of Greece-Turkish relations.   
 Inferentially, energy security policy dimension in modern international 
relations indicates that such cooperation can be the starting point of further 
normalization in the long-standing troubled Greek-Turkish relations and a paradigm 
that the Greek and the Turk side can develop bilateral policies in a higher level. 
Nevertheless, third party in Greek-Turkish relations can promote or not the 
cooperation or antagonism among the two states in accordance with their geo-
strategic, political, security and financial interests.   
 
b. Baku-Ceyhan versus Burgas-Alexandroupoulis oil pipeline project. 
 
 First of all, it is important to clarify that it is not easy to compare BTC and B-
A oil pipeline projects while the Burgas - Alexandroupoli project is still under 
construction(even though all the parties - Russia-Bulgaria-Greece - which will 
participate in the construction had already agreed, in March 2007, for its realization). 
Additionally, BTC oil pipeline, on the other hand, is operational since 2006 and its 
importance can be estimated by the way Andris Piebalgs commented on the project, 
“[…] the Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan oil pipeline has been a milestone project. Today it 
brings to the world market roughly 1 million barrels of oil per day and doubling of its 
capacity has been already envisaged. This project has had also a decisive geopolitical 
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importance as it opened a new transport corridor for abundant Caucasus and Central 
Asia oil resources to the world market.”206 
 However, despite the above mentioned clarifications, both pipeline projects 
reflect the Greek and Turkish energy initiatives; they both serve the need for 
diversification and in terms of geostrategic, both they constitute Bosporus by-pass 
pipeline alternates. Hence, by taking into account those prerequisites (which allow us 
to conduct a comparative study between them), our aim is to examine the degree and 
the level under which the Greek and Turkish energy security policies-pipeline 
diplomacies are antagonistic or not, during the period 1999-2007.  
 Russia’s incentives to promote BA construction relied on the idea to by-pass 
the congested Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, thus Turkey set limits on the passage 
of tankers207. In addition, BA project composes one more alternative for Russia to 
deliver Azeri oil through its territory (Novorossiysk port) and at the same time 
Turkish-US efforts to exploit Azerbaijan’s oil and transfer it through Turkey and 
mainly non-Russia territory. E. Karagiannis points out that, BA project is part of the 
geopolitical contest between Russia and Turkey over the control of oil routes and that 
the development of Baku-Ceyhan pipeline can’t counterbalanced with BA pipeline 
construction. Moscow would still be dependent on the Bosporus Straits for the 
Russian crude oil transportations.208  
 BA pipeline project mostly favors regional needs and that is the reason why 
Charles Ries, ex-American Ambassador in Athens characterized “the agreement for 
                                                            
206 At the Conference which held in Istanbul, June 5th 2007 about “Turkey and Europe: Together for a 
European  Energy Policy”  ,(Available  from: http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=5964&l=2  [AVRUPA 
BİRLİĞİ GENEL SEKRETERLİĞİ]   
 
207 Ibid 
208 E. Karagiannis, op.cit., pp.133 
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the construction of the Burgas - Alexandroupolis oil pipeline as positive, since it can 
increase diversification and the factor of ‘energy security’ in the region, ‘as well as of 
broader parts of Europe.”209It is a fact that, after the construction of BTC oil pipeline, 
the US through the BTC achieved to limit Russian influence in Caspian Basin and BA 
is not a project that could possibly restore the Russian energy influence in the area. 
Nevertheless, the future realization of the BA oil pipeline it will reduce the Bosporus 
Straits strategic importance for Turkey; but at the same time it will diminish the 
Turkish concerns over the environmental causes of the increasing transportation 
through the congested Turkish Straits.    
Obviously, if only we consider the Greek-Turkish energy policies through the 
lens of third party role in the Eurasian energy “chessboard”, we have the opportunity 
to draw valuable conclusions. In order to provide our analysis with credibility, we 
suggest that we should also have to examine the interlinked with the BA and the BTC, 
the South Stream and the Nabucco natural gas pipeline proposals.  
 According to Bülent Aras aspect of the emerging geopolitical relations in 
Eurasia, we can see two main blocks of states: “On one side are Russia and Iran along 
with a series of smaller power, including Greece and Armenia. On the other side are 
Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and, as recent developments indicate, 
Israel...which are in increasing competition in each other.”210    
     By adopting Aras categorization, the BA (oil) – the South Stream (gas) 
pipeline projects constitute the Greek pipeline diplomacy and the BTC (oil) – the 
                                                            
209 An interview of Charles Ries to V. Nicoloudia and A.Konachou, ‘Diverse energy resources, assure 
security’, The Bridge magazine, Q4/2006 ‐ Issue 3, pp.38‐41  
210 B. Aras, op.cit., pp.1 
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Nabucco (gas) pipeline projects, respectively, the Turkish pipeline diplomacy in 
Eurasia.  
Consequently, if we enlist the BA and the South Stream projects in broader 
Russian pipeline diplomacy aspirations and the BTC - Nabucco in the US pipeline 
diplomacy agenda, we can examine the range of antagonism among the Russo-
American energy strategies in the region. EU’s geopolitical role in pipeline diplomacy 
field, due to the lack of a sufficient integrated energy and foreign policy, is 
undermined211; a fact that allow us to base our analysis on the role of Russia and the 
U.S.A. 
 The struggle between the US-EU and Russia in Eurasian energy “battlefield”, 
can best be seen in the competing proposals of the Nabucco and the South Stream to 
supply European “energy-thirsty” markets. For Turkey, the Nabucco project will be a 
major step to accomplish its regional strategic goals. Turkey’s intermediating process 
between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, in order to resolve their dispute over their 
Caspian Sea’s zones of economic exploitation, reveals its active support to the project. 
Moreover, on May 6th 2008, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European 
and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza, stated that: 
 “[…] priority must go to the construction of the TGI pipeline and said that 
the supply of 80 percent of natural gas consumed by Greece by one 
company, Russia's Gazprom, laid the country open to the dangers of 
depending on a monopoly[…] and warned against allowing completion of 
the TGI to languish in favor of South Stream, expressing doubts whether 
"all sides" in Greece appreciated the importance of the TGI arriving in the 
                                                            
211 G. Bakatsianos, ‘Strategic planning and petropolitics’, The Bridge magazine, A quarterly review on 
the Greek presence in S.E Europe and S.E Mediterranean, Q4/2006 - Issue 3pp.68   
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market first and adding that, otherwise, Greece might end up with only the 
South Stream.”212 
 Russia’s antithetic pipeline diplomacy agenda to the US energy aspirations 
highlighted by the Russian diplomat Mikhail Savva who argued that, the United 
States had a “more restricted diversification of energy supplies since, as regards 
natural gas supplies, it depends for more than 85% of its supplies on Canada 
[…]”213adding also that Russia in its energy cooperation, “[…] and particularly with 
Greece, steadfastly adheres to the principle of ‘equal cooperation’.”214 
 
 In contrast, Greek Prime Minister K. Karamanlis in his speech about the Greek 
energy security policy and pipeline diplomacy, he clarified that:   
“[…] the security of energy supply is thus clearly recognized as the most 
important priority of Europe’s energy security policy […] Greece is 
willing and ready to assume its role in furthering the principles of this 
policy, taking full advantage of its geo-strategic position in South-East 
Europe […] I wish to clearly stress that projects, such as South Stream, 
Nabucco and the Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy, are complementary 
to each other. Given the expected rise in demand for natural gas each and 
every one of these new infrastructures is very much needed.”215 
     The European Union’s perceptions over the Nabucco and South Stream 
projects approached more the Greek aspect. Ferran Tarradellas Espuny (spokesman 
for the EU’s Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs) stressed: “[w]e’re not against 
                                                            
212 See http://www.foreignpress‐gr.com/search/label/south%20stream 
213 See http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/Content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=925& 
article=23713 
214Ibid 
215 See http://www.emportal.rs/en/news/region/86408.html 
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South Stream […] we think South Stream is a pipeline that could help security of 
supply. Maybe the Russians think it is against Nabucco, but we do not think it could 
endanger Nabucco because what Nabucco is going to provide is gas from different 
suppliers. What South Stream is going to provide, is what we already have – Russian 
gas. It’s going to come from a different route, but it’s the same.”216 
 Finally, the Nabucco and the South Stream pipeline proposals (along with less 
significance BTC and BA projects), demonstrate the crucial dimension of pipeline 
diplomacy in modern international relations doctrine. Turkey and Greece, favored by 
their geostrategic position in Eurasia, participate in an energy game that will 
determine for decades to come the destiny of the US, European and Russian positions 
and role in the future global developments.    
          
       
 
   
 
  
  
     
 
 
 
                                                            
216 See http://www.neurope.eu/articles/86300.php 
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Conclusion  
In the 20th century Greek-Turkish relations were shaped up in an antagonistic 
and more often conflicting environment between the two states. Cyprus and the 
Aegean Sea issues are in the nucleus of Greco-Turkish dispute(s). During the period 
1999-2004 an outstanding U-turn in bilateral relations occurred. The “rapprochement 
period’ process marked both countries efforts to reach a more stable, cooperating 
status of relationship.  
Cyprus accession in the EU and the beginning of Turkish-European 
negotiating procedure (for Turkey’s membership in the European Union), though 
brought to a halt the initial enthusiasm of “rapprochement” progression. From 2004 
onwards, Greek-Turkish dilemmas over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea were back again. 
None the less, in the energy sector, the realization of the TGI gas pipeline project in 
2007, as an outcome of the previous “rapprochement” reconciliation process, reveals 
that Greece and Turkey managed to complete an outstanding cooperative project in a 
high bilateral level.  
The geostrategic position of Greece and Turkey (which share common land 
and sea boarders) in the broader Eurasian region are significantly important in the 
energy security policy and pipeline diplomacy game in this area.  
Greece’s energy security policy and pipeline diplomacy in the region (during 
1999-2007) highlighted Greece’s will to ensure its domestic energy domestic needs 
and render Greece’s role as an important energy transit player for the European 
Union’s energy supply efficiency. Respectively, Turkey (the same period) succeeded 
to upgrade its regional position as an energy transit state and made sufficient steps in 
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order to cover its domestic energy supply needs. Energy security policy and pipeline 
diplomacy became one of the most prominent instruments for Turkey’s foreign policy 
ambitions to elevate itself as a hegemonic regional player and a potential future 
energy ‘hub’ between East and West.  
Thus, it is a fact that, third party role (US-EU-Russia) directly influences the 
route of the Greek and Turkish energy security policy-making and the pipeline 
diplomacy strategies of each country.  US-Russian competitive energy policies along 
with EU’s energy security initiatives in Eurasia signify that Greece and Turkey 
actively participate in the Eurasian energy game. The realization of the future 
(competitive in US-EU-Russia’s perspective) pipeline proposals (Nabucco, South 
Stream and BA) will determine not only their role in the energy chessboard and will 
upgrade or diminish their geostrategic and geopolitical status but will also further 
intensify the future developments in Greek-Turkish relations. 
Overall, the conclusion we can draw from the Greek-Turkish energy policy 
sector until 2007 is that the realization of the TGI Interconnector gas project ratified a 
cooperating status in bilateral level. Energy dimension can mold a crucial path 
through which both countries will have the opportunity to reduce the tensions over 
their disputable issues. In addition, energy security policy and pipeline diplomacy 
(along with the future realization of oil/gas pipeline projects), as an ongoing process, 
will confirm or obstruct future attempts of reconciliation among those two 
neighboring states. None the less, it is crucial to underline that the third party played a 
significant role in Greek-Turkish energy-pipeline cooperation. Consequently, even 
though the level of Greek-Turkish reconciliation process then seemed to limit such an 
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important venture, interstate factors’ influence in Greece’s and Turkey’s bilateral 
affairs did not have a negative effect on the construction of the TGI project.  
However, it is up to future inquiry to examine the EU-Turkish relations, the 
Cyprus issue and  the modern ‘neo-Ottomanic’ Turkish foreign policy doctrine, can 
affect the way Turkey perceives its role as a potential energy ‘hub’, its regional power 
and how it will implement its dogma of ‘zero conflict’ with its neighbors. On the 
other hand, it is interesting to see how Greece will utilize its pipeline diplomacy 
dimension, through its long-standing permanent foreign policy of ‘peaceful settlement 
of disputes.’ 
Conclusively, energy security policy and pipeline diplomacy cooperation can 
play a positive role in the Greco-Turkish reconciliation process and as Mustafa Aydin 
suggests, “It is clear that the fundamental interests of both countries lie in peace and 
cooperation [such as TGI project], not confrontation. It is literally absurd to have the 
sky over the Aegean Sea shadowed by military aircraft while both countries stand to 
benefit from developing friendly and good-neighboring relations.”217                        
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                            
217 M. Aydin, ‘Crypto‐optimism in Turkish‐ Greek relations. What is next?’, Journal of Southern Europe 
and the Balkans, Vol. 5, No. 2, August 2003 
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APPENDIX 
 
APPENDIX I 
Part VIII  
REGIME OF ISLANDS 
Article 121  
Regime of islands 
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above 
water at high tide. 
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory. 
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall 
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. 
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APPENDIX II 
The sentences are in bold in order to highlight the most important decisions of the 
meeting related to Greece and Turkey:  
   Art.4 […] In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful 
settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges 
candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and 
other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute 
to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation 
relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the 
accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International 
Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004...  
Art. 9. (a) The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and 
expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to bring the 
process to a successful conclusion. 
(b)[…]If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, 
the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a 
precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors. 
Art. 12. The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as 
noted in the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its 
reforms towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate State 
destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other 
candidate States […] This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on 
progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular 
reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in 
paragraphs 4 and 9(a)…  
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APPENDIX III 
Index I (Current info for the Greek energy sector) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries 
 
 
Source 
(Origin) 
Pipeline 
(km) 
Route Capacity Cost Operational 
status/Comments 
Greece, 
FYROM 
Oil 
(?) 
Vardax 
pipeline 
Thessaloniki- 
Scopje 
2,5Mtoe      ? Operational since 2001 
 
Bulgaria, 
Greece 
 
Oil 
(Russia) 
 
Trans-Balkan 
pipeline 
(900km) 
 
Burgas  - 
Alexandroupo- 
lis (286km) 
 
35Mtoe/ 
50Mtoe 
(potential 
expand) 
 
€800 m. / 
€900m. 
(pt.cst) 
 
Estimated date of 
construction 2010 
Russia,  
Bulgaria,  
Greece 
 
Gas 
(Russia) 
Yamal-Europe 
Pipeline (total 
4.100km) 
Bulgarian/ 
Greek borders 
(B-G branch) 
 
33bcm 
annually 
(6bcm to 
Greece) 
 
Close to 
€8 b. 
 
Operational since 
1999(Germany) 
 
Libya, Greece 
 
LNG 
(Libya) 
 
         -x- 
Libya-
Revythousa 
refinery 
13mcm 
daily 
 
€300 m. 
 
Operational since 
1999-upgraded in 2007 
Azerbaijan, 
Georgia 
Turkey, 
Greece, 
Italy 
 
Gas 
(Azerbaijan 
/and in the 
future Iran 
,Turkmenistan) 
TGI 
Interconnector 
(total 417 km, 
85km & 
100km in 
Greek ter/ry) 
First branch  
Baku (Shah 
deniz)/Kara- 
abey/Komotin
i 
Second Branch 
(Stravrolimenas/
Otranto) 
0.75bcm 
(annually 
2007) 
12 bcm 
(3bcm) in 
Greece in 
2013 
 
Estimated 
total cost 
€2.8 b. 
 
 
Operational since 2007 
(a’ branch)/ Potential 
completion of second 
branch, 2012 
Russia, 
Bulgaria, 
Greece (south-
western branch) 
 
Gas 
(Russia) 
South Stream 
Pipeline 
(2000km) 
Beregovaya-
Burgas-
Alexandrou 
polis-Italy 
30bcm 
annually 
Estimated 
total cost 
€8 b. 
Potential completion 
date 2013-15 
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APPENDIX IV 
Index II (Current info for the Turkish energy sector) 
Countries 
 
Source 
(Origin) 
Pipeline(km) Route Capacity Cost Operational 
status/Comments 
Iraq, Turkey Oil   (Iraqi) Kirkuk-
Yumurtalk 
twin parallel 
pipelines 
(966km) 
Kirkuk-
Musul-
Ninawa-
Ceyhan 
71Mtoe annually ? Operational since 
1974,1987/Don’t 
function properly due 
to Gulf War 
crisis(1990-1), Iraq 
war(2003).Technically 
available 
Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Turkey 
Oil  (Azeri) BTC pipeline 
(1760km total, 
770km in Turk. 
territory) 
Chirag-
Baku-
Tbilisi-
Ceyhan 
50Mtoe(&5Mtoe 
to Kirikale 
refinery in 
Ankara) 
annually 
US$4 b., 
(US$2 b. 
Turkish 
section)   
Operational since 
2006 
Algeria, 
Nigeria, Turkey 
LNG(Algerian
, Nigerian) 
         -x- Marmara 
Ereğlisi 
terminal  
5.2bcm [4bcm 
(Algerian),1.2 
bcm (Nigerian) 
annually ] 
US$364m. Operational since 
1994 
         ?   LNG (?)          -x- Aliağa 
(İzmir) 
terminal  
6bcm annually US$364m. Completed since 2002 
/ since 2006 didn’t 
operate 
Iran, Turkey Gas( Iranian) Iran-Turkey 
pipeline 
(2.577km) 
Tabriz-
Erzurum-
Ankara 
30mcm daily US$600m. Operational since 
2001/Suffers from 
PKK attacks and 
reduction of supplies 
by Iran[doesn’t 
function properly] 
Russia, Turkey Gas (Russian) Blue Stream 
undersea 
pipeline 
(1.212km, 
300km in Turk. 
territory) 
Izobilnoye-
Dzhugba-
Samsun-
Ankara 
16bcm US$3.6 b. Completed in 
2002/formally 
inaugurated in 2005 
Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Turkey 
Gas  (Azeri) BTE pipeline 
(69km total 
length) 
Shaz-Deniz 
– Baku-
Tbilisi-
Erzurum  
8.8bcm initial 
capacity/ 
possible 
expansion to 
20bcm (2012) 
US$900m. Operational since 
2006 
Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, 
Turkey,Bulgaria
,Romania, 
Hungary,Austria 
Gas 
(Turkmen, 
Kazakh,Iraqi,
Egyptian) 
Nabucco 
pipeline (2.050 
total length) 
Turkmenista
n-Erzurum-
Baumgartner 
30bcm (pt 
annually) 
US$6 b. Estimated date of 
completion 2015 
Azerbaijan, 
Georgia 
Turkey, 
Greece,Italy 
Gas 
(Azerbaijan/ 
and in the 
future 
Iran,Turkme-
nistan) 
TGI 
Interconnector 
(total 417 km, 
200km in Turk. 
territory) 
First branch  
Baku (Shah 
deniz)/Kara- 
abey/Kom
o-tini 
Second 
Branch 
(Stravrolime
nas/Otranto) 
0.75bcm 
(annually 
2007) 
12 bcm 
(1.75bcm) in 
Turkey in 2013 
Estimated 
total cost 
€2.8 b. 
 
Operational since 
2007 (a’ branch)/ 
Potential completion 
of second branch, 
2012 
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APPENDIX V 
Dr Yüksel İnan, Professor of International Law at the Department of 
International Relations in Bilkent University in Ankara, in his article on the occasion 
of the 65th anniversary of the Montreux Convention, aimed to explain the passage 
regime of merchant vessels through the Turkish Straits in time of peace. Among 
others he argues that: 
 
“Turkey, in 1994 and 1998, totally replaced the former regulation and started to 
use its rights effectively in regulating the passage and navigation of civil vessels 
through the Turkish Straits, in conformity with the general principles of international 
law. Indeed, various IMO documents approved Turkey's measures. Among those 
documents are IMO Res. A/857 and the IMO Doc. MSC 
71/WP.14/Add.2, dated 27 May 1999, continuing the IMO adopted routing system, 
including the associated IMO Rules and Recommendations adopted in 1994 
(Res.A/857) since those measures were effective and successful. The IMO Resolution 
stated that the organization’s measures were established for safety of navigation and 
protection of the environment, and all national measures should be in conformity with 
those aims. 
The concept of security has changed a great deal since the 1930s. So, coastal 
states, while trying to regulate freedom of passage and navigation, should not only 
take into account the security of passage and navigation, but also the security of the 
lives and property of the people living in the area and of the environment, including 
the marine environment. All developments in the law of the sea Concerning the 
security of the vessel, of passage and navigation, and the protection of the 
environment should be fully observed while regulating passage and navigation by 
legal norms […] Turkey was not only being empowered due to the security principle 
enshrined in the preamble of the Convention, but also by the general principles of the 
law of the sea including UNCLOS.  
Indeed, Turkey took those points into account while enacting the 1994 and the 
1998 regulations, which have international implications. The regulations are traffic 
separation schemes (TSSs), temporary suspension of the TSSs or its sections and 
advising a vessel in the area to comply with rule 9 of the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREG), in case of inability to comply with the 
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TSSs either for technical or geographical reasons, temporary suspension of one- or 
two-way traffic, maintaining a safe distance between vessels, participation in the 
reporting system (TUBRAP), giving prior information for the purpose of efficient and 
expeditious traffic management and for the safety of navigation and environment, to 
offer pilot age or towing services for safer navigation, to ask the vessel to navigate in 
daylight through the Straits for ships over 200 meters in overall length and for vessels 
having a maximum draught of 15 meters or more, etc.16 In addition to these measures 
Turkey has taken unilaterally, VHF systems and Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) will 
soon be constructed along the Turkish Straits17 and these will contribute greatly to 
safety of passage and navigation. 
Increasing vessel traffic through the Straits affects Istanbul. The city is of 
great importance because of its 10 million inhabitants its historical character, 
UNESCO having declared it a World Heritage site for its 3000-year history and for 
having hosted many cultures. These features of the city and its environment capture 
the attention of the environmentalists. Scientists maintain that an LPG tanker 
explosion in or near the Istanbul Strait would have the same effect as a quake of 11.0 
on the Richter scale. This undeniable reality increases the importance of the Turkish 
government's measures to safeguard passage and navigation and protect the 
environment, and it makes third parties' respect for these measures imperative.” 
 
 
